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FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher
Workmen and Affiliated Crafts of
North America, District Union Local
AFL-CIO
and

Award

Acme Markets, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated July 20, 1967 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
Under the terms of the Agreement of July 20, 1967
the Employer did not improperly demote Fay Gower
from the position of Assistant Acme Market Manager
on February 3, 1969.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: November 24, 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss. :
)

On this 24th day of November, 1969,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.
Case No. 69A/7981

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher
Workmen and Affiliated Crafts of
North America, District Union Local #1
AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

Acme Markets, Inc.

In accordance with Article XXXIX of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated July 20, 1967 between Acme Markets,
Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Employer," and Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Butcher Workmen and Affiliated Crafts of
North America, District Union Local #1, AFL-CIO, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated
as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue:
Under the terms of the Agreement of July 20, 1967
did the Employer improperly demote Fay Gower from
the position of Assistant Acme Market Manager on
February 3, 1969? If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in New York City on October 1, 1969 at
which time Mr. Gower, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Employer and Union, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and
were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties ex-

pressly waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contractual provision for a tri-partite Board of Arbitration; agreeing instead to submit the issue for determination to the Undersigned
as sole Arbitrator,,

The parties filed post hearing briefs.

- 2 The Union complains that the grievant was improperly removed from the post of Assistant Market Manager on February 3,
1969 after holding that job since September 3, 1968, in favor
of two consecutive appointees who were junior in seniority to
the grievant„
It is the Union's contention that the grievant1s ability
and qualifications for the Assistant Market Manager job were
and are at least equal to those of the two subsequent appointees; that any deficiencies in the operations within his jurisdiction during his tenure were not his fault; and that therefore there was no legitimate basis for his demotion under
Article XXII Section L a. and b. of the contract.
In addition to the Management Rights Clause (Article
III A), the Employer also relies on Article XXII Section L.
a. and b. in support of its action.

Its case, in part, is

based on its determination that the grievant did not perform
his duties as an Assistant Market Manager satisfactorily despite notice to him of his deficiencies and counselling by
the District Supervisor; and that the grievant thereby demonstrated a lack of ability to meet the job responsibilities of
an Assistant Market Manager, and hence was properly demoted.
Article XXII Section L a. and b. read:
L. a_. Respecting the promotion and demotion, rehiring and transfer from one type of work to another,
or location to another, the qualifications and ability of the employee shall be considered in conjunction with seniority standing. The promotion shall
be based on fitness and ability with seniority a
factor only when fitness and ability are equal.

- 3 b. The selection, promotion, demotion and transfer of employees in the Assistant Acme Market
Manager, First Meat Cutter, Department of Head
and Head Cashier classifications shall be subject to joint discussion between Employer and
Union but the final decision shall be the prerogative of the Employer„
Although the provisions of Sub-Section b. above bear on
the Employer's argument as to how the Arbitrator should interpret the entire foregoing contractual provision, it is
undisputed that the "joint discussion" requirement of SubSection b. was complied with in connection with the grievant's
demotion.

Therefore, as I see it, it is principally with the

application and interpretation of Sub-Section a. above that
this dispute is concerned,,
The Employer also asserts that the grievant's promotion
to the job in question (at Acme Market No. 8316) on September
3, 1969 was only temporary in nature, and that the grievant
was so advised and took the job on that basis.

It claims

that the grievant directly, and the Union representative indirectly, were notified that the grievant was to fill the job
only until Mr. Dave Bolles completed the liquidation of a
different store later that year, at which time he (Bolles)
would be appointed to the job.

And with Bolles1

appointment

the grievant was to be re-assigned to his original classification as a Produce Department Head0

The grievant and the

Union deny knowledge of this condition to or limitation on
the September 3 appointment„
I consider the Company^ claim that the grievant's
appointment was only temporary to be immaterial.

For it is

conceded that Bolles who replaced the grievant following the

- 4 latter's demotion and Mr. French who thereafter succeeded
Bolles in the position, were both junior in seniority to the
grievant.

So, whether the grievant's original appointment

was to be temporary or not, he would still have a

contractual

right to complain, under Article XXII Section L a . of the contract (as indeed he and the Union do in this proceeding) because of his greater seniority over both subsequent appointees
and his assertion of at least equal ability,,
Accordingly because it would not be dispositive of the
issue in dispute, I find I need not decide whether the grievant was notified at the time of his appointment that it was
temporary in nature.
As I see it, though the facts are unique to the nature
of the business involved, this is a classical "seniority and
ability" case.

In such matters the widely held view among

arbitrators is not to overturn the Employer's judgment of the
relative abilities and qualifications among the employees involved, unless that judgment is found to be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.

In other words, there is a gener-

al presumption in favor of the Employer's judgment, rebuttable
not simply by a different evaluation made by the Arbitrator,
but only where the Employer's judgment is so unsupported by
the facts and circumstances as to be inexplicable, grossly unfair or unconscionable.

My own approach has been generally

consistent with this view, except that where that presumption
is not found to be supported by pertinent contract language,
I tend to liberalize the rule by also applying a required
standard of reasonableness to the Employer's action.

In the

- 5 instant case, however, the more restricted presumption is
found in the contract language of Article XXII Section L,
Sub-Sections a. and b.

Sub-Section a. clearly provides for

a priority in favor of the senior employee, only when his
fitness and ability are equal to employees with less seniority0
Or in other words, even if the senior employee is capable of
performing the job, a junior employee with greater ability
would be able to preempt him.

And obviously, if the senior

employee is unqualified, he is foreclosed from competing for
the job.
Also Sub-Section a. must be read together with Sub-Section
b.

The former sets forth the manner by which fitness, ability

and seniority shall be weighed in cases of promotions, demotions, rehiring and transfers.

But the latter expressly

preserves the final decision as a prerogative of the Employer.
This means, to my mind, that not only is it a prerogative of the Employer to make the final decision on comparisons
of fitness and ability amongst employees with different seniorities, but that that decision is also final unless so
erroneous as to be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.
Or put another way, in view of the provisions of Sub-Sections
a. and b., an arbitrator lacks the authority to overturn the
Employer's decision merely because, in weighing the evidence
on both sides, including that in support of the Employer's
decision, he disagrees with or reaches a different subjective
judgment from that of the Employer.
In the instant case there is considerable evidence in

- 6 the record to support the Employer's conclusion that the
grievant did not and could not perform his duties as Assistant
Market Manager at store No. 8316 satisfactorily.

And conse-

quently I cannot find that that conclusion and the decision
based thereon to demote the grievant, was so contrary to the
facts and circumstances as to be arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory.

This is not to say that there is no evidence in

support of the Union's contention that the grievant was not
at fault, but rather that weighing the evidence on both sides,
there is enough in support of the Employer's judgment so as to
protect it under the widely followed rule in such matters, as
reinforced by Section XXII, Sub-Sections a. and b. of the contract.
Specifically, the Employer charges that the grievant was
deficient "in the principal areas of his duties of ordering
and supervising the stock operation."

It offered testimony

by the grievant's District Supervisor to the effect that for
extended periods of time, various departments within the store
were without certain stock; that the inventory in the storeroom areas was not adequate; that the shelf alignment and
displays within the store were incomplete; that the grievant
was spoken to about these conditions several times, and
assigned a specialist to help him straighten out the ordering
and shelf alignment situation; and yet unsatisfactory conditions persisted.
These conditions are not disputed by the grievant nor
by the Union on his behalf.

Rather, certain explanations,

- 7designed to absolve the grievant of fault, are advanced.

It

is asserted that the grievant should not be held responsible
for deficiencies in ordering stock, because he merely carried
out the orders of his store manager, whom it is conceded
suffered from a "drinking problem" and who was subsequently
retired early.

That the condition of the storeroom inventory

was beyond the grievant's control because his inventory was
disarranged by the influx of stock from another store which
had been closed, making it unclear for several weeks what was
on hand and what needed to be ordered.

And that the stock on

the shelves and the shelf alignment was performed by night
shift employees during hours when the grievant could not supervise them directly.
Thus the question narrows down simply to whether the explanations advanced by the Union and the grievant are enough
to so nullify the evidence upon which the Employer made its
decision as to render that decision arbitrary, capricious or
discriminatory.

I think not.

No doubt the grievant worked

under some troublesome conditions.

Yet I am not persuaded

that they were of such a substantial or chronic nature as to
explain away the deficiencies of the operations under his
jurisdiction for the extended period of almost six months
that he held the job.

I think it most unlikely that he would

have assumed full responsibility for any erratic orders of
his manager, especially in view of his undisputed knowledge
that the District Supervisor was not satisfied with his work.
Yet not until the processing of his grievance did he defend

- 8 himself from the criticism of his District Supervisor on that
latter ground.

Moreover in the face of the District Super-

visor's explicit instructions to straighten out the Light
Bulb and Stationery Departments, the grievant was unable or
unwilling to do so.

It strikes me that confronted with the

displeasure of his Supervisor in that particular situation,
he would have found a way to cure the defect, even if the
stocking of the shelves of those Departments was performed
by night shift employees.

And if his Manager countermanded

the instructions of the District Supervisor, I think it reasonable to assume that the grievant would or should have made
that known, in his own defense.

No doubt the integration of

the stock from another store created some confusion.

Yet it

happened only once and cannot be an excuse for continuing
stockroom inadequacies.

Indeed, the problems which the griev-

ant faced could have been overcome by the exercise of those
administrative and organizational abilities which one would
expect of an Assistant Market Manager.

Or if not, at least

in the face of the criticism, displeasure and counselling
from his District Supervisor, the grievant should have revealed what he thought to be insurmountable obstacles to the
satisfactory performance of his duties.

Either way the

Employer's judgment that he lacked the ability to do the
job, is based on factual grounds and probative evidence, and
cannot therefore be faulted as arbitrary, capricious or discriminatory .
In short, though I believe there were certain circum-

- 9 stances which may have made the grievant's tasks more difficult, the record in support of the Employerfs determination
is not so frivolous or unsupported by the evidence as to rebut the presumption in its favor.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

r
In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'

International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers District #47,
Phoenix Lodge #315

'
'
'
i
'

and
Airco Welding Products Division
Air Reduction Company, Inc.

Award

'
'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated April 1, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
The amount of vacation pay which the Company paid
John Sindle upon his layoff in May, 1968 was
correct. The Union's grievance is denied.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss< .
)

On this
day of January, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case #69A/260

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers District #47
Phoenix Lodge #315
and

Opinion

Airco Welding Products Division
Air Reduction Company, Inc.

In accordance with Article X of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated April 1, 1968 between Airco Welding
Products Division, Air Reduction Company, Inc.,

hereinafter

referred to as the "Company," and International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District #47,

Phoenix

Lodge #315, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the
Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
To what termination vacation pay was John Sindle
entitled when laid off on May 23, 1968?
A hearing was held at the Company plant in Union, New
Jersey on October 18, 1968, at which time representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all con-

cerned to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's oath.

The parties expressly waived the

The parties filed post hearing statements

and the hearings were declared closed as of December 3, 1968.
This dispute involves the application and interpretation
of the following pertinent paragraphs of Article VII, Section
20 sub-section 6) of the contract which read:

- 2 If the termination occurs after one full year
of service but before the completion of two years
of continuous service on a fiscal basis, and provided a vacation was taken or paid for in lieu
of vacation, the employee is entitled to onetwelfth of one week's vacation pay for each full
completed calendar month of continuous service
from the employee's first anniversary date to the
date of termination.
If no vacation was taken in that second fiscal
year or paid for in lieu of vacation, the employee
is entitled to one week's vacation pay plus onetwelfth for each full completed calendar month of
continuous service from employment anniversary
date to date of termination.
Mr. Sindle, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant,"
was hired on August 22, 1966.

A year later, in August, 1967

he received one week's vacation.
laid off.

On May 23, 1968 he was

Upon his layoff he received termination vacation

pay in the amount of 8/12 of one week's vacation.
The Company asserts that its payment of 8/12 of one
week's vacation was proper under the applicable foregoing
contract provisions.

The Union contends, also under the

foregoing contract language, that the grievant was entitled
to one week's pay plus the 8/12 of one week's pay.
Based on the evidence before me I am persuaded that
the first contract paragraph quoted above is applicable and
not the second.

And I am also satisfied that the Company

met the contract requirement in paying the grievant 8/12 of
one week's pay upon his layoff.
There is no dispute about the fact that the grievant's
termination occurred after one full year of service but before the completion of two years service on a fiscal basis.
I find also that "a vacation was taken," within the meaning
of that phrase in the first paragraph of the foregoing con-

- 3 tract provisions.

He received one week's vacation in August,

1967 which fell within the period of time between his first
year's service and before the completion of his second year
of service.

And it is clear that the phrase "provided a va-

cation was taken or paid for in lieu of vacation" refers to
the period after one year of service but before the completion
of the second year.

So the grievant received the vacation re-

ferred to in the first paragraph of the aforementioned contract provisions.

Per force therefore, the last portion of

that contract provision comes into play.

It provides for ter-

mination vacation pay in an amount equal to 1/12 of one week's
pay for each completed month of service from his first anniversary date to the date of his layoff.

In this case the

period from his first full year (or anniversary) to his layoff was 8 months, and accordingly his termination pay entitlement was 8/12 of one week's vacation.
The second paragraph of the contract provision referred
to above I find inapplicable to the facts of this case.

It

provides for one week's vacation pay plus 1/12 for each full
completed calendar month, only, as the introductory language
states, "if no vacation was taken in that fiscal year ..."
In the instant case the grievant received a vacation in the
second fiscal year, and therefore that circumstance ousts his
case from the provisions of this second paragraph.
In other words, the foregoing second paragraph is an
alternative provision to the first paragraph.
read together.

Both must be

Under the first paragraph, where an employee

has received a vacation after the first year but before the

- 4completion of the second, he is entitled to vacation termination pay only in the amount of 1/12 of a week's pay for each
full month of service completed between his first anniversary
date and the date of his termination.

And under paragraph 2,

if he has not received a vacation after the completion of his
first year but before the end of his second, he would be entitled upon layoff to the one week's vacation which he did
not receive (for his first year of service) plus 1/12 of one
week's pay for each full month completed thereafter.
So the Union's grievance would be meritorious if the
grievant had not received a vacation during the second year
based on his entitlement of one full year of service.

But he

did, and therefore the facts in his case fall within the provision of the foregoing first paragraph and not the second.
Moreover this conclusion is well supported by past practice.

This present contract language was the same in the three

previous agreements between the parties, spanning the period
from 1960 to 1968.

During that time there were 29 layoffs or

terminations of employees with more than one year service but
less than two.

In all but two instances the employees received

termination pay in accordance with the Company's interpretation
of the contract.

The Company's explanation that the two var-

iations were merely clerical errors, is plausible.
I recognize that On the face of it, the effect of this
interpretation of the contract is to grant an employee with
one year and 8 months of service no more pay, if laid off during his second year, than would be granted an employee who
was laid off after only a total of 8 months employment.

But

- 5it must be recognized that this payment is not treated solely as termination pay under the contract, but rather as termination vacation pay.

It is intended to compensate an em-

ployee for vacation time earned but not received. In the case
of an 8 month employee, he would have earned only 8/12 of one
week's vacation-In the case of the grievant, he had earned
one week's vacation based on his first full year of service,
which he received, leaving only 8/12 of one week's pay still
due him as vacation for his service during the second year.
Only after he has completed his second year of service, as
provided by Article VII, Section 20, Sub 1) is he entitled to
a full second week of vacation.

So I find nothing inequitable

about the amount of termination vacation pay received by the
grievant, as compared to a hypothetical employee with only 8
months of service.

Moreover I am satisfied that this inter-

pretation, based on the contract language and past practice,
is simply a reflection of the contract bargain entered into
by the parties.

A different result is a matter for collective

bargaining and not arbitration.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

United Steelworkers of America,
Local 2242, AFL-CIO

'
'
i
'
i

and
Alleghany Ludlum Steel Corporation
Wallingford Steel Company Plant

Award

'
'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 6, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as
follows:
1. The three day suspension of Henry Pruitt is
reduced to a one day suspension. He shall
be made whole for the other two days.
2. The discharges of G. Becker and T0 Bouza
were for just cause and are upheld.

Eric a. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December 19, 1969
STATE OF New York
)gg .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this 19th day of December, 1969,
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me
me to be the individual described in and
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged
ted the same.

before me personally
known and known to
who executed the
to me that he execu-

T

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
t

United Steelworkers of America,
Local 2242, AFL-CIO

'
'
i

and

'

Opinion

Alleghany Ludlum Steel Corporation
Wallingford Steel Company Plant

In accordance with Article V of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated August 6, 1968 between Alleghany Ludlum Steel
Corporation, Wallingford Steel Company Plant, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and United Steelworkers of America,
Local 2242, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issues;
1. Did the Company have just cause for the suspension of Henry Pruitt on November 21, 22 and 23,
1968? If not, what shall be the remedy?
2. Were the discharges of G. Becker and T. Bouza
for just cause? li not, what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held in Wallingford, Connecticut on October
13, 1969 at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to collectively as the "parties,"
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
filed a post hearing brief on Issue #2.

The

The Union

The parties agreed to

extend the due date for the rendition of the Award until on or
before December 22, 1969.
Issue #1

As I see it this is a classic "sleeping on the job versus

- 2 'I was sick'" Case.
The Company contends that on November 20, 1968 Mr. Pruitt,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," left his work place
without permission of or notice to his foreman; failed to respond to several pages of his name over the public address system; and was thereafter found by his foreman stretched on a
bench on the second floor level of the plant locker room; and
did not awaken or sit up until the foreman shook him by the
shoulder.
The grievant, and the Union on his behalf, assert that he
became ill during the early part of the shift; and he reported this to his foreman; that he went to the second floor of
the locker room to obtain two aspirins from his locker; that
announcements over the public address system cannot be clearly
discerned at that location; and that he was neither asleep nor
lying down when found in the locker room by the foreman, but
rather sitting up.
Based on the evidence before me I believe that the grievant was both sick and asleep.

I conclude the latter because

I find no reason to disbelieve the testimony of foreman Di
Guardi, who stated not only that he saw the grievant in a prone
position with his eyes closed, but had to shake him by the
shoulder in order to awaken him.

There is nothing in the re-

cord to indicate antagonism or ill will between DiGuardi and
the grievant and hence I find no reason why the former should
bear false witness.
By the same token the weight of the evidence supports

- 3 the grievant's contention that he was sick during his shift
that day.

Determinative I conclude, is the testimony of

vomiting.

The grievant testified that he was sick to his

stomach and vomited; and this was corroborated by the testimony of a fellow employee, James McCabe, who stated not only
that the grievant told him he had vomited, but personally observed the vomit on the ground outside the plant door.

Sig-

nificant I think is the fact that DiGuardi acknowledged that
the grievant stated when awakened, that he did not feel well
and had taken aspirin.

And uncontradicted is the testimony

of another employee, John Sartori, who was the then local
Union President, that DiGuardi stated in the course of the
grievance procedure that the grievant "didn't look up to par."
Also, Sartori testified that he too saw the vomit residue.
So, though I find that the grievant was indeed asleep
in the locker room during his regular working hours, I also
find that he was ill.
Because this is a disciplinary matter, with the burden
on the Company to clearly prove the elements of its case, I
am prepared to accord the grievant some benefit of the doubt
by concluding that there was a causal relationship between
his illness and his state of sleep.

Accordingly, because the

three day suspension was based on the Company's determination
not only that the grievant was asleep, but also its disbelief
of his claimed illness, I find that the full measure of the
discipline imposed is not warranted„
However, the grievant cannot be found blameless.

Even if

- 4he told his foreman earlier in the shift of his illness, he
is not excused from his failure to notify supervision at the
time that he left his work area to go to the locker room.
was not so ill that he could not have done so.

He

Nor should he

have permitted himself to fall asleep without some notice to
Supervision of his condition and whereabouts.
Considering all the foregoing I am satisfied that some
disciplinary penalty, but less than the three day suspension,
is appropriate.

I think that the grievant's willingness to

work the balance of his shift that night rather than accept a
pass to go home when he stated that he had been ill, must be
construed in his favor, in the light of my finding that he was
actually ill.

In that frame it demonstrates an attitude of

responsibility toward his work.

Therefore in accordance with

my authority to fashion a remedy, my imposition of a lesser penalty shall be more in his favor than the Company's.

I direct

that the three day suspension be reduced to a suspension of one
day, and that he be made whole for the other two days0
Issue #2
Messrs. Becker and Bouza, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievants," were discharged for alleged theft.

The question

of whether there was just cause for the discharges involves
both substantive and procedural aspects.

Substantive, is the

question of proof of the grievants' culpability of the offenses
charged, to the standard required in discharge cases.

Proced-

urally, the question is whether the grievants were accorded
"due process" under Section 6.02 of Article VI of the contract0

- 5 On the substantive question I find for the Company.

Un-

disputed is evidence that in the course of a police investigation the grievants gave and signed statements admitting the
facts upon which the theft charge is based, together with
signed statements acknowledging that they had been accorded
their constitutional rights in connection with the preparation
of those statements.

Those statements were introduced into

evidence by the Company in this arbitration, and substantively,
stand unrebutted and unexplained by the grievants.

Therefore

in my judgment, they are sufficiently determinative of the
grievants1 culpability, as grounds for discharge in this arbitration, where the standards of proof

in such matters are

less demanding than in a criminal proceeding.
Article VI Section 6.02 reads:
Any employee who is summoned to meet with any
Management representative for the purpose of
being given a disciplinary suspension shall be
entitled to be accompanied by a Union representive if he so desires.
The Union claims a breach of the procedural requirements
of the foregoing section because a Union representative did
not accompany the grievants when they were interrogated by
the Company in the course of an investigation of the thefts„
Specifically, the Company's Industrial Relations Manager met
with the grievants and questioned them concerning the "confessions" they gave the police.

A Union representative was

not present nor were the grievants told of any possible right
of Union representation.
day or so later.

The grievants were discharged a

- 6 The main thrust of the Union's case on the procedural
question is that Section 6.02 was intended to apply, and if
it is to have any real protective effect must apply, to those
circumstances where employees are summoned not just to hear
of the disciplinary suspension imposed, but for investigations
and interrogations which may lead to disciplinary action. Or
in other words, if Union representation is to be a meaningful
protection to employees, that representation must be available
when they are investigated as well as when disciplined.
I fully appreciate the "due process" concept advanced
by the Union and I am sympathetic to it.

But I must conclude

that the full achievement of that concept in this contractural
relationship is a matter for further negotiations between the
parties and not arbitration.
Section 6.02 was negotiated by the parties themselves,
and not by some outside legislative body.

As such the parties

had full control over how that clause was to be worded and to
what circumstance it would apply.

Consequently, where as

here, the language is clear, the Arbitrator is bound to apply
and enforce that language as written.
This is to be distinguished I believe, from certain legislative restraints on customary due process, where the affected party played no direct part in the legislation, and where
its application to him might therefore be construed on a more
liberal basis to assure protection of his rights„
is not the case here.

But that

The "legislators" of Section 6.02 and

the parties affected are the same.

Hence the Arbitrator

- 7 should not read into the clause any provision which it does
not contain.

Clearly, if the parties intended Section 6.02

to cover investigative meetings between Management and an employee they could have included that coverage within the language of that Section.

Obviously, inquiries, investigations

and other types of preliminary procedures involving discussions between Management and an employee which could lead to
discipline against the latter, were or should have been well
within the contemplation of the parties at the time that
Section 6.02 was negotiated and written,,

That that Section

was expressly limited by its clear language to the circumstance
where an employee is summoned to meet with a representative of
Management "for the purposes of being given a disciplinary
suspension" means just that and no more.

This is especially

true, where, as in the instant case, there is no evidence of
a practice or even of any grievance settlement in support of
the Union's interpretation.
The me eting which the Industrial Relations Manager
held with the grievants was simply not for the purpose of
giving a disciplinary suspension.

It was, concededly, to

investigate the charges against the grievants and their statements to the police.

As such, though the grievants may well

have been better represented and protected had a Union representative been present, and despite my personal view that
Union representation ought to be accorded an employee on
those occasions if he requests it, Section 6.02 of the contract does not now accord that right.

Therefore, the Company's

- 8 investigation which led to the decision to discharge the grievants was not violative of the procedural requirements of
Article VI Section 6.02 of the contract.
For all the foregoing reasons the discharges of G. Becker
and T. Bouza were for just cause.

J
Eric j, Schmertz
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive
Board of New Jersey
Award
and
Opinion

and
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Anheuser-Busch, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive Board of New Jersey, hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated
as the sole Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was Albert Ginsburg properly discharged?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New Jersey
Brewers' Association in Newark, New Jersey on November 26,
1968 at which time Mr. Ginsburg, hereinafter referred to as
the "grievant," and representatives of the Union and Company,
hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.

The

The Company

filed a post hearing brief and the hearings were declared
closed as of December 14, 1968.
This case involves a classical problem of credibility
and also some unusual elements of mystery.

I find mysterious

the pronounced reticence of the Company's key witness, General Foreman Hand to reveal that he prepared a written nemo -

- 2 randum of the events of the morning of March 2, 1968.

More-

over, I am surprised that that written statement did not include the alleged effort of the then Union Shop Steward (who
is now deceased) to "cop a plea" on behalf of the grievant.
If, as Mr. Hand orally testified, the Steward asked for the
opportunity to do so, it would constitute "an admission against
the grievant's interest" recognizable to laymen as well as
lawyers and an important part of any recitation of the events0
However, despite these two mysterious aspects to Mr.
Hand's testimony, I resolve the question of creditability in
favor of the Company, and I accept the testimony of Messrs.
Hand and Axne as to what took place at the panel of control
switches.

I do so simply because I find no reason why these

two general foremen would falsify or fabricate a case against
the grievant.

There is no evidence or record of animosity,

or other difficulty between the foremen and the grievant; nor
any capriciousness on the part of the former; nor anything in
the employment relationship upon which a charge of false testimony could be based„
Therefore I am persuaded that on March 2, 1968 the grievant turned the control switches from the "auto" position to
the "hand" position.

And per force I must reject his testi-

mony that he turned the switch to the "off" position because
he thought there was a jam on the conveyor line and then turned the switches back to "auto" upon some signal from someone
working overhead.
By accepting the Company's version of what took place,
and by rejecting the grievant1s explanation, I must conclude

- 3 that the grievant committed a wrongful act.

The Company charges

that he "tampered" with the control switches, and that this constitutes an act of "industrial sabotage."

The charges or con-

clusions of "tampering" or "industrial sabotage" presuppose a
malevolence on the part of the grievant or a willful intent to
injure the Company and disrupt production.

If such was the

grievant1s intent, or if he was so motivated, or if the record
supports such a conclusion, there can be no doubt that his
discharge was proper.
But again mystery is present.

Aside from his bare act of

turning the switches to the "hand" position (which may disrupt
the normal operation of the conveyor and roller systems, resulting in serious damage to production by extensive jams,
bottlenecks and spillage of cans and bottles), there is no
direct evidence suggesting any reason why the grievant did it.
Neither his past employment record, nor his relationships with
other employees or with supervision; nor any other information
about him reveal a willful intent to do damage to the Employer.
There is no evidence in the record that he harbored anger or
resentment toward the Company; that his employment was of an
adversary nature; or that he would profit or gain in any manner from sabotaging the production of the Company for which
he worked for more than a decade, in an industry in which he
had, and presumably would continue to earn his livelihood.
(Of some significance, I believe, is the fact that since his
discharge he has worked satisfactorily in another brewery
without incident).
The Company has proved that he committed a wrongful act

- 4by improperly turning the switches.

But I am not satisfied

that it has proved the malicious intent or malevolence which
would support a conclusion of "tampering" or "industrial
sabotage.'.'

Other explanations of his conduct are realistic-

ally possible.

In other words, the evidence does not preclude

these other possibilities.
It is undisputed that employees in the grievant's classification may, as part of their job duties, turn the switches
from one position to another as conditions warrant.

So it

was not improper for him to operate the switches on the control panel.

It is possible therefore that he committed a

gross mistake in turning the switch to the "hand" position
and is now seeking to cover up that error.

I think it also

possible that he may have suffered from some temporary imbalance, which led him to believe that he was acting correctly.

Also possible, is that emotional or mental stress, with-

out malice, may have impelled him to commit the wrongful act.
As indicated I do not think that the evidence or the record
exclude these possibilities.

Nor am I persuaded by clear and

convincing evidence that the only reasonable explanation for
the grievant's action was a willful intent to damage the
Company by an act of "industrial sabotage."
So, though discharge would be wholly proper for a
wrongful act based on malice, malevolence, or conscious intent to damage the Company a lesser penalty should be imposed
if the act was prompted by the other less nefarious possibilities.

In this case, I am constrained to resolve the mystery

of the grievant's motice in his favor, simply because, as I

- 5have indicated, the record does not dispel that mystery, and
because in the case of a discharge I think the Company has the
burden to do so.

That the grievant was responsible for earlier

"jams" or incidents of a similar type is purely speculative,
unsupported by any probative evidence in the record.

And for-

tunately the March 2nd incident did not result in damage, as
there were few if any products on the conveyor system at the
time0

This is not to say that I conclude that the grievant

did not commit an act of "industrial sabotage," but rather
that the mysterious unexplained circumstances surrounding his
conduct leave me unconvinced of that conclusion to the exclusion of other possibilities.
Therefore 1 choose to fashion a remedy which imposes some
penalty on the grievant but less than the ultimate penalty of
discharge, and 1 so AWARD:
If he wishes, the grievant shall be reinstated to his
former position with the Company. But I direct that
he suffer some loss of seniority and some loss of net
pay. Accordingly, upon reinstatement his seniority
shall be that which he enjoyed on the date of his discharge, or in other words, he shall not be credited
with seniority during the period from his discharge
to his reinstatement. His record shall be adjusted
to show that the discharge is converted to a suspension to run from the date of discharge to the date of
his reinstatement.
His reinstatement shall be without back pay, but as
this would not impose a monetary loss upon him because he worked elsewhere in the industry during the
period of his discharge, I direct that he be penalized by the loss of one month's pay. That amount of
money shall be deducted from the grievant's pay over
the next 12 months of his employment, or at the rate
of 1/12 of his regular monthly pay each of the next
12 months of his employment.
Also the grievant is advised that if he chooses to
return to the Company's employ he may be subject

- 6 to surveillance if the Company wishes to maintain
surveillance over him. The Company has a right to
protect itself not only after an act of sabotage has
taken place, but also to prevent such acts. So if
the grievant repeats his act of turning control
switches to wrongful positions, there would be a
strong if not irrebuttable presumption, in the
view of this Arbitrator, that he did so willfully
and with a malicious intent to sabotage the Company' s production, and his forthwith discharge
should be upheld.
Additionally, if the grievant displays a course of
conduct, attitude, work record or personality quirks
which might logically be construed as forewarnings
or forerunners of a repeat of the wrongful act involved in this case, or one of a similar nature, the
Company shall have the right to take reasonable
steps to protect itself against the actual occurrence
of these acts.

Eric A. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 10, 1969
New York, New York

In the Matter of the Arbitration between i
i
Brewery Workers Joint Local Executive
i
Board of New Jersey
i
i
and
i
i
Anheuser-Busch, Inc.
i

Supplemental
Award

On January 10, 1969 I rendered an award on the issue of the
discharge of Albert Ginsburg, hereinafter referred to as the grievant,
The parties to that arbitration have jointly reinstated my
authority for a review of the record concerning that portion of my
award assessing a penalty of one month's pay.
A review of the record discloses that the grievant was out of
work for sixteen days during the period of his discharge.

In find

therefore, that his loss of pay for those sixteen days meet the
purpose of the one month pay loss which I imposed.

Accordingly that

portion of my award assessing a monetary penalty of one month's loss
of pay is hereby deleted.

All other portions and provisions of the

Award remain in full force and effect as before.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January 25, 1969
New York, New York

.

NEW JERSEY STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
i
„
, __„_„„_„__ _«_..______»-__™.»^__»__,_____«^ ^

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 262 United Bakery, Confectionery,
Cannery, Packing and Food Service Workers Union, AFL-CIO
and
Great A & P Bakery, Newark, New Jersey

'
'
»
'
'
'
'
i
'

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designaged in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated July 26, 1968 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards as follows:
The discharge of Otis Williams is reduced to a disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated without back pay, and the period of time between his
discharge and his reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension for a second breach of
Article VII (c) of the contract.

Eric/'J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this
day of August, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

Case # 68-423

X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 262 United Bakery, Confectionery,
Cannery, Packing and Food Service Workers Union, AFL-CIO
and

"
'
i
'
'
'
t
'

Opinion

Great A & P Bakery, Newark, New Jersey

In accordance with Article X of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement dated July 26, 1968 between A & P Bakery, Newark,
New Jersey, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and
Local 262 United Bakery, Confectionery, Cannery, Packing and
Food Service Workers Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue:
Was Otis Williams discharged for just cause?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New Jersey State
Board of Mediation on July 25, 1969, at which time Mr. Williams,
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives
of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as
the "parties," appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
The grievant was discharged for a second violation of
Article VII P aragraph (c) of the contract which reads:
All available overtime work shall be equitably
divided among the employees. All employees shall
receive at least four (4) hours notice of overtime and may be excused there from upon presentation of a reasonable excuse and if replacement can
be obtained,,

- 2 On November 18, 1968 the grievant refused to work overtime and offered no excuse other than "personal reasons" for
his refusal.

There is no dispute that he received at least

four hours notice of the overtime schedule.

There is no

assertion by the Union that "personal reasons" without further
specific explanation by the grievant constituted a "reasonable
excuse" within the meaning of the foregoing contract clause.
The record discloses that the grievant received a disciplinary suspension from September 20 to October 1, 1967 for
his failure or refusal to complete an overtime assignment at
that time.
Under the normal application of the well settled rule of
"progressive discipline," the penalty of discharge may be imposed for a subsequent contract violation or misconduct if the
employee had been disciplined to a lesser degree (either by
formal warning or suspension) previously for the same offense.
That rule applies to those offenses for which the penalty of
summary dismissal is too severe or precipitous.

Its intent,

not only to discipline and ultimately terminate an employee
who persists in proscribed conduct, is to afford an opportunity
for the employee to rehabilitate himself and cease any further
prohibited acts or conduct.

Implicit, I believe, in the pur-

pose of rehabilitation is that the employee understand what
is expected of him and be put on notice not only that his first
contract breach or misconduct is unexcused, but that any repetition may result in his termination.

It is on this last point

that I think this case differs from the classical application
of the progressive discipline formula.

- 3 Based on the grievant's testimony at the hearing together
with the circumstances surrounding the disposition of his
grievance in 1967, I am not fully satisfied that he comprehended his obligation to work overtime under the conditions
and with the limited exceptions set forth in Article VII (c)
of the contract, or that he understood the disciplinary suspension between September 20 and October 1, 1967 was due to
his breach of that contract requirement.
I accord him the benefit of his statement that he was
not familiar with the provisions of Article VII (c).

Also it

appears that the grievant thought his earlier disciplinary suspension was not for a refusal to work overtime, but rather because he left his work assignment without authorization after
he began, but before completing the overtime.
In short, there is some doubt in my mind as to whether
the grievant was sufficiently on notice, either by knowledge
of the contract or by comprehension of the reason for the
earlier disciplinary suspension, of what the Company would not
tolerate and what it was about his behavior which needed
correction.
Accordingly, for that special reason I conclude that the
penalty of discharge is too severe.

What is appropriate is

one final disciplinary suspension, imposed as a result of
this Award, which clearly places the grievant on notice that
the contract requires overtime to be worked under the terms
and conditions set forth in Article VII (c), and that any further violations of that provision by him, would, in the
opinion of this Arbitrator, constitute grounds for his discharge

- 4 The grievant's discharge shall be reduced to a disciplinary suspension.

He shall be reinstated without back pay and

the period of time between his discharge and his reinstatement
shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension for a second violation of Article VII (c) of the contract.

The parties are

directed to notify the grievant accordingly so that there is
no further possible misunderstanding about his status and the
reasons for his disciplinary action.

Eric /f. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 259 United Automobile Workers
Award

and
Automobile Dealers Industrial
Relations Association of New York, Inc,
on behalf of Rogers Pontiac Co., Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated June 30, 1967 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The Company violated the contract when it closed its
entire Service Shop on October 2, 1968. It had the
right to lay off one half of the Service Shop work
force that day in accordance with seniority. The remaining one half of the Service Shop work force,
namely those with greater seniority were entitled to
work that day and accordingly shall be paid one day's
pay at their regular rate as a measure of damages.
The Arbitrator's fee for the first hearing, at which
the Union requested and was granted an adjournment,
shall be borne by the Union. The balance of the
Arbitrator's fee shall be shared equally by the
parties.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

June,

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this
day of June, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

Case No. 1330 0790 68

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 259 United Automobile Workers
and

Opinion

Automobile Dealers Industrial
Relations Association of New York, Inc.
on behalf of Rogers Pontiac Co., Inc.

In accordance with Section XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated June 30, 1967 between Automobile Dealers
Industrial Relations Association of New York, Inc. on behalf
of Rogers Pontiac Co., Inc., hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and Local 259 United Automobile Workers hereinafter
referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as
the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated
issue:
Did the Company violate the contract by closing on
October 2, 1968? If so, what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American Arbitrtion Association on May 12 and June 18, 1969 at which time
representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred
to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.
October 2, 1968 was Yom Kippur.

The Company closed down

its operations that day because it anticipated a sharp reduction in its business.

Based on the amount of its business

on Yom Kippur the prior year (when it remained open) and over
the Rosh Hashanah holidays in 1968 (when it also remained open)

- 2 the Company determined that its business in the Service Shop
would be half of normal if it remained open on October 2. The
Company contends that its action was in accordance with
Section XXIII of the contract which reads:
A. In the case of a layoff, except probationary
employees, the Employer shall give 3 working
days notice to the employees affected or 3
days pay in lieu thereof.
B. If an employee reports to work such employee
is to receive at least 8 hours work or pay.
The Employer, however, may, in line with seniority, notify any employee by 5:00 P.M. of
the day prior to the time such employee must
report for work to the effect that he need
not report in which event the Employer need
not pay such employee any amount or give such
employee any work that day. The Employer shall
not abuse this provision.
The Union charges a violation of that Section as well as
Sections XIX, XVII and IV of the contract.
I find no violation of Section IV.

The entire Service

Shop was closed and the Company's decision to suspend operations that day, clearly was not discriminatorily based upon
the factors set forth in that Section.
I do not find a violation of Section XIX.

That Section

relates to the loss of an economic benefit which the employees
enjoyed prior to the signing of the Agreement; but does not
bear on the Company's express right under Sections XXIII and
XVII of the contract to reduce its work force in the event of
a diminution of work.
Accordingly this dispute involves the application and
interpretation of Sections XXIII and XVII.
Obviously the layoff provisions of the contract (Section
XXIII) must be read in conjunction with the seniority clause

- 3 (Section XVII.) The former Section specifically provides for
notice of layoff "in line with seniority."

The latter Sec-

tion also provides, in clear terms, an order of layoff in
accordance with seniority following the layoff of probationary employees.

So the two Sections are interrelated.

I am satisfied that the Company notified the employees
in the Service Shop of the decision to close the entire Shop
on October 2, 1968 within time limits required by Section
XXIII.

However, I find that the Company went beyond the in-

tended scope of Sections XXIII and XVIII in laying off all
the Service Shop employees that day.
The express condition that employees may be laid off
"in line with seniority" means, if it is to have any meaning
at all, that the layoffs are to be commensurate with the quantity of diminution in the available work.

Therefore, where

there is no available work in the Service Shop, all the Service Shop employees may be laid off.

On the other hand if

there is significant available work, but less than the normal
amount, the Company may lay off only those employees not needed as a result of the diminution.

But to lay off the entire

force in that circumstance would be to deprive some of the employees, especially those with greater seniority, of the
opportunity to work on the remaining available service work.
In the instant case the record discloses that a significant amount of service work was in fact available for October
2, 1968.

The Company conceded that its business that day

would have amounted to about one half of normal.

So work was

- available for at least one half of the Service Department work

- 4force.

It cannot be asserted, and indeed the Company does not

make the assertion, that such a quantity of available work is
de minimus in nature.
The contract does not provide for a guaranteed work week
irrespective of the quantity of the work available.

It does

provide for layoffs in accordance with seniority in the event
of a reduction in business.

But the Company's right to effect-

uate layoffs must be reasonably equivalent to the quantity of
that reduction.

Hence when one half of the normal quantity is

available the Company need only retain one half of its employees
for that day.

But it may not lay off everyone.

Accordingly the Company erred when it closed down its entire Service Shop on October 2, 1968.

It had the right to lay

off one half of the Service Shop work force that day, provided
seniority was followed.

The remaining one half of the Service

Shop work force, namely those with greater seniority were entitled to work that day and accordingly shall be paid one day's
pay at their regular rate as a measure of damages.

Sric/J. Schmertz /
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 102, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
Award

and

Borden Metal Products Company

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated January 1, 1968 and having
been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The discharge of Frederick Meyers is reduced
to a second disciplinary suspension. He shall
be reinstated but without back pay. He is
directed to immediately commence, and thereafter continue to maintain, a satisfactory
record of attendance and punctuality as a
condition of his continued employment. If not,
the Company has grounds for his summary dismissal.

a^X^
Eric XT.rSchmertz
z
/
Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
)Ss.•
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case No. 1330-0624-69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

s

'
i

Local 102, International Brotherhood
of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America
and

'
'
'
i
'

Opinion

Borden Metal Products Company

In accordance with Article XVI Section (E) of the contract dated January 1, 1968 between Borden Metal Products
Company, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local
102, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, hereinafter referred to
as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Frederick Meyers? If not, what shall the
remedy be?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on September 26, 1969 at which time
Mr. Meyers, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and
representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties filed post

hearing data and statements, and the hearings were declared
closed as of October 27, 1969.
The grievant was discharged for a record of excessive
absenteeism and lateness extending over 3-1/2 years, for
L

which he was previously both warned and suspended,,

- 2The evidence clearly establishes the excessive and unsatisfactory nature of the grievant's attendance record for
the period of time involved.

Nor is the prior warning or

prior suspension disputed by the Union.

Also, I find no

significant improvement in that record during the one year
period between the grievant's suspension and discharge.
Under the well recognized principle of "progressive
discipline," which the Company has properly applied to this
case, together with the equally well settled rule that permits an employee's discharge for chronic absenteeism irrespective of cause, I can fully appreciate why the Company took
the action it did.

But there is one factor in the record

however, which leads me to believe that the grievant may not
only have been unable to prevent some of his absences and
tardiness (which standing alone would not be a mitigating
factor), but that he may now be able, forthwith, to maintain
a totally satisfactory record of attendance and punctuality.
There is evidence in the record that some of his absences and
tardiness stemmed from a medical problem concerning his foot
and leg.

If this condition was chronic, together with the

balance of his attendance record, it would not be enough to
immunize h'_m from discharge, no matter how he sustained the
foot condition and even though it may have been beyond his
fault or control.

For no matter what the reason, an employ-

er is entitled to regular and sustained attendance from an
employee; and if he does not get it, regardless of the reason,
he is not obligated to retain that employee.

But assuming

the bona fides of the foot and leg condition (I choose to

- 3 accord the grievant the benefit of the doubt in that regard,
as the medical evidence both ways represents a standoff), the
grievant testified that just prior to his discharge, that
condition had been cured; and that he is now ready and able
to attend to his job on a regular and satisfactory basis.
Though there is of course some doubt, I think it possible
that he can now radically change his record, so as to immediately commence, and thereafter maintain, an attendance
record fully satisfactory to the Company.

Therefore I have

decided to afford him the opportunity to do so.
direct his reinstatement.

I shall

But because there is not yet evi-

dence of an improved record of attendance, he shall not receive back pay, and the period of time between his discharge
and reinstatement shall be deemed a second disciplinary suspension.

The grievant is warned that his record of attend-

ance must become satisfactory forthwith, and that he must
maintain a record of attendance and punctuality thereafter on
a satisfactory basis as a condition of his continued employment.

If not, and no matter what the reason, the Company

would have grounds to discharge him summarily.

Eric/tf. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration

Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Brentwood Teachers Association
Award

and
Brentwood Public Schools
Union Free School District

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated March 27, 1968 and having duly
heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as
follows:
A requirement that teachers work without additional compensation beyond 10 minutes after the final
bell to place students on homeward bound buses that
arrive late is violative of the contract. This
Award applies not only to the period from September
1968 to the date of the grievance, but prospectively
when and where the circumstance occurs. No retroactive pay is awarded. However, from the date of
this Award forward, where, because homeward bound
school buses arrive late at the schools, teachers
are required to remain beyond 10 minutes after the
final bell to place students on those buses, such
teachers shall receive additional compensation at
straight time pay for the extra time so worked.

Eric y.* Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: March
1969
STATE OF New York
)Ss.COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of March, 1969 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 1330 0020 69

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Brentwood Teachers Association

i
and
Brentwood Public Schools
Union Free School District #12

'
i
'
'

Opinion

In accordance with Article III Level 4 of the Contract
Agreement dated March 27, 1968 between Brentwood Public
Schools, Union Free School District #12, hereinafter referred
to as the "District," and Brentwood Teachers Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association," the Undersigned was
designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute relating to the Association's claim that the Contract has been
violated when teachers are required to remain beyond 10 minutes after the final bell in order to place students on late
arriving school buses.
A hearing was held at the District's office in Brentwood,
New York, on March 4, 1969 at which time representatives of the
Association and the District appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath and the contract provision calling for the
rendition of the Arbitrator's Award within 14 days after the
close of the hearing.
From the beginning of the school year in September, 1968,
the District has experienced difficulties with its school buses
Buses which take students from the District's school to their
homes at the end of the school day, arrive late at three spec-

- 2 ific schools; namely South Elementary, Southwest Elementary
and Hemlock Park Elementary.

Initially all of the teachers at

those schools were required to remain with their students until the last of the students was placed on a bus.

As a re-

sult teachers at these three schools remained beyond 10 minutes after the final bell, for varying amounts of time. Later
by arrangement among the teachers and with the agreement of
the District, only those teachers assigned to "bus duty" remained when buses arrived late.
There is agreement that the problem has improved substantially since September.

But it is not yet entirely solved. It

is also undisputed that the 10 minute period after the final
bell is the normal time in which teachers place students on
homeward bound buses if the buses arrive at the schools on
time.

And that if the prescribed bus schedule is met, the 10

minute period is adequate.

There is no disagreement between

the parties on the instances of bus lateness, nor do they disagree on the amount of time teachers remain beyond 10 minutes
after the final bell.

It is stipulated that the District's

records in this regard shall obtain.
The Association1s position is supported by the language
of the contract.

Article IV Section A provides in pertinent

part that:
Teaching hours shall be 15 minutes before attendance is taken until 10 minutes after the final
bell
and that
The required work day shall be no longer than
6 3/4/ hours...

- 3 It is undisputed that the total period of time between 15
minutes before attendance and 10 minutes after the final
bell is 6 3/4 hours.

Therefore any work by a teacher beyond

10 minutes after the final bell is in excess of 6 3/4 hours,
and hence more than the "required work day."
The District contends that Section C.I. of Article IV
constitutes a pertinent exception to foregoing contract provisions.

I am unable to agree.

Section C.I. does provide

for circumstances under which teachers are expected to remain beyond the normal work day.

But I do not conclude that

"bus duty" is among those circumstances.

Said Section reads:

Teachers are expected to remain after the end of
the normal work day when necessary and without
additional compensation to fulfill their professional obligations connected with the teaching of children, such as participation in parentteacher conferences, tutorial help of students,
case conferences, in-service professional growth
activities or meetings, etc0
The District contends that "bus duty" is included within the "etc."

Neither by the general rules of contract in-

terpretation nor by the past experience of the parties, can
such a conclusion be reached.

I agree with the District's

argument that "bus duty" is among the obligations of a professional teacher, but within the context of Section C.I, I
am not persuaded that it is a professional obligation
connected with the teaching of children.

Indeed Section C.I

sets forth certain examples of obligations connected with
the teaching of children, namely conferences, tutoring, professional growth activities and meetings.

Under the tradi-

tional rule of contract interpretation, the use of "etc."

- 4following such enumerated examples means additional activities of a like nature.

I am not satisfied that the parties

intended that "bus duty" be considered an activity similar
to the enumerated examples, and I do not believe that it can
be deemed similar by any normal definition.

Moreover the

use of "etc." is designed to cover those circumstances which
the parties could not reasonably contemplate at the time that
the contract was written.

Difficulties with bus transporta-

tion was manifestly within the knowledge and contemplation
of the parties at the time this contract clause was negotiated.

In the prior year the District experienced bus diffi-

culties as well.
in that year too.

Homeward buses arrived late at the schools
And that condition was discussed by the

parties during their negotiations of the current contract.
Therefore if "bus duty" beyond 10 minutes after the final bell
was intended to be included within Article IV Section C.I. the
parties could, and should have listed that circumstance as
one of the exceptions to the required work day of 6 3/4 hours.
That they did not, means to me, that that duty was not meant
or intended to be among the professional obligations connected with the teaching of children, and hence not encompassed
within the "etc."
Nor can I accept the District's argument that the complaint should be dismissed because it is de minimus.

With

the exception of the month of December, 1968 during which
buses were late for a total of only 9 minutes throughout the
entire month, the accumulated time in each of the other
months, September 1968 through February 1969 amounted to

- 5 several hours, and involved significant numbers of teachers.
In those months homeward bound buses arrived late at the
three schools on a substantial number of days each month.

I

do not consider this to be de minimus. Moreover, the District
itself did not act as if it viewed the condition as de minimus,
It took definitive steps, both in making its own administration more efficient and in its dealings with the bus contractor, to correct the problem as quickly as possible.

So it, as

the Association, recognized the problem of late arriving
buses to be sufficiently troublesome to demand decisive remedial action.
For the foregoing reasons I find that work beyond 10 minutes after the final bell to load students on homeward bound
buses, is not within the teachers' regular work day, nor within the explicit exceptions to that work day.

Accordingly,

the requirement that he do so without additional compensation
is violative of the contract,,
Remaining are the questions of to what period of time
the Association's complaint applies, and what remedy, if any,
should be fashioned.

I find that because buses continued to

arrive late after the date of the Association's complaint,
that complaint is in the nature of a "continuing grievance."
It applies of course to the period of time from September to
the date it was filed, but was intended obviously, to cure a
condition prospectively as well, if that condition persisted.
And therefore, because that condition has persisted albeit on
a considerably improved basis, the Association's complaint,
and my Award shall apply not only to the period before the

- 6 grievance was filed, but prospectively as well.
I have decided not to fashion a retroactive remedy for
two reasons.

First I believe that the Association, though

it requests retroactive overtime pay, is more interested in an
end to bus duty beyond 10 minutes after the final bell and to
an Award that such work is not within the teachers' regular
work day; and second, because I am convinced that the District
has made a determined and good faith effort to correct the
problem, the fault for which lies primarily with the bus contractor.

Therefore, the Association's request for retroactive

pay is denied.

And because it expressed no interest in com-

pensatory time off, that possible remedy shall not obtain
either.

However, if from the date of this Award, the teachers

remain 10 minutes beyond the final bell in order to load students on buses which have arrived late, those teachers shall be
compensated for that additional time at their regular rates of
pay.

Such additional pay is clearly contemplated by the lang-

uage of Article IV Section C.I.

That section sets forth the

circumstances under which teachers are expected to work beyond the normal work day "without additional compensation."
Therefore other duties beyond the normal work day not encompassed within that Section or elsewhere in the contract, must
be paid for if performed„

And in the absence of an explicit

formula for premium pay, I find no basis to fix the rate beyond straight time.
My prospective Award shall be implemented by the parties
in accordance with a "rule of reason."

I am sure the Associa-

tion will agree that isolated instances, involving negligible

- 7 amounts of time beyond 10 minutes after the final bell, may
not be totally avoidable.

And a claim for pay in such circum-

stance may be unreasonable.

On the other hand, the District

must recognize that the teachers have never claimed they have
the right to abandon the children before placing them on homeward bound buses.

On the contrary, the teachers and the

Association recognize an overriding responsibility to care for
the children and see that they are safely installed on the
buses no matter how long they must wait for the bus beyond 10
minutes after the final bell.
Therefore, absent agreement of the Association on a plan
of compensatory time off, the sole remedy available to the
teachers is additional compensation for that time.

And I

Award that remedy, prospectively from the date of my Award,
in those situations, under a "rule of reason," where the
amount of extra time, either singly or cumulatively, and the
number of instances, is beyond the negligible,,

&4/^44*A*JL4

Eric/5. Schmertz
Arbitrator

?
FEDERAL MEDIATION & CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration between
District 15 International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO
and

Award

Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated November 1, 1967 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The phrase "December 31 of each vacation credit
year" set forth in Section 2 of Article XV of
the contract means December 31 of the year in
which the vacation is taken. Specifically, in
the instant grievance, it means December 31,
1968. Employees who took or were eligible for
vacations during the summer of 1968 were entitled
to vacation time measured by their service up to
December 31, 1968 even if that part of their service from the date of their vacation to December 31,
1968 was anticipatory, provided they met the other
undisputed qualifications for a vacation.
The Company shall grant the affected employees the
appropriate additional vacations.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

196
)ss. •
)

On this
day of
196 , before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case # 69A/812

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
District 15 International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc.

In accordance with the Arbitration Provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated November 1, 1967 between Brockway Motor Trucks, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
the "Company," and District 15 International Association of
Machinists, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide the following stipulated issue:
What is the appropriate interpretation of Article
XV of the contract dated November 1, 1967 with reference to vacation eligibility?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in New York City on December 16, 1968 at
which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared.

Full

opportunity was afforded the parties to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

parties waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract provision for a tri-partite Board of Arbitration, agreeing instead
to submit the issue for determination to the Undersigned as
the sole Arbitrator,,
What is actually in dispute is the meaning of the underscored phrase of the following portion of Section 2 of Article
XV:

- 2An employee will receive vacations as set forth
in this Section according to the vacation service credits he has acquired prior to December 31
of each vacation credit year, and calculated in
accordance with the provisions of Section 3 and
4 of this Article, if the employee has also met
the requirements of Section 5 of this Article.
The Union contends that the date of December 31 referred
to above, is the year in which the vacation is taken.

In the

instant grievance, which involves a claim for additional vacation time of the year 1968, the date of December 31 means
that date in the current year, 1968.

In other words, under

the Union's interpretation employees who take their vacations
during the summer months of 1968 would be entitled to an
amount of vacation based not only on service up to that time,
but also anticipated service to December 31, 19680
The Company interprets the reference to December 31 as
meaning that date in the year before the current vacation is
taken.

Or in other words, employees taking vacations

during

the summer months of 1968, receive amounts of vacation
based only on their service up to December 31, 1967.
The parties agree that if the Company's interpretation
is upheld, the affected employees have received the correct
amount of vacation time0

But if the Union's

interpretation

is granted, the affected employees are entitled to and shall
receive additional vacation time.
Under the Union's interpretation an employee may receive a vacation entitlement based, in part at least, on a
period of employment which he has not yet served.

His

vacation during the summer months of 1968 would be calculated,
in part, on service he is yet to perform from the end of

- 3 that vacation to December 31, 1968.
If this seems incongruous, so too is the effect of the
Company's interpretation.

The Company's view could mean that

an employee hired soon after December 31, 1967 would have to
serve a year and a half before he had acquired the requisite
one year service credit for a vacation.

It would mean that

not until the vacation period in the year 1969, or a year and
a half after he began work, would he have compiled at least
one year service prior to December 31, 1968.

So that under

the Company's interpretation, some employees may have to serve
well beyond the minimum before they are entitled to any vacation.
A full reading of Article XV persuades me that the disputed language means the year in which the vacation is taken,
even if, as a result, the amount of the vacation entitlement
is in part "anticipatory."

The language "prior to December 31

of each vacation credit year" cannot refer to an earlier year,
thereby disregarding all service during the year in which the
vacation is taken, simply because Section 3 which sets forth
the manner in which vacation service is to be computed, provides for computation from the first day that the employee
began until the last day of his employment. So all continuous
service is to be credited toward vacations, which must per
force include, in the instant case, service performed during
the year 1968.

And therefore the date of December 31 must

mean December 31, 1968.

For if it meant the year 1967 all

service actually performed in 1968 , even that from January
to the summer months when the vacations are taken, would be

- 4 totally disregarded for purposes of computation.

And that

would be inconsistent with the intent of Section 3.
Moreover, if the disputed language was intended to mean
December 31, 1967 or December 31 of the year prior to that
in which the vacation is taken, it could easily
" have said
so.

Indeed, where the parties did mean the prior or previous

year they had no difficulty in setting that forth - specifically in Section 5 of the same Article.

There, in fixing

the hours of attendance required in order to be entitled to
vacations, the contract speaks of at least 960 hours of
work during the previous vacation credit year. But though
they could have, the parties did not use such language in
the disputed Section of Section 2.

Instead, that Section

talks only of December 31 of each vacation credit year.

If,

as the Company argues, it was intended to mean the previous
year, the language of Section 2 could and should have been
the same as the pertinent language of Section 5, namely by
wording the present disputed language of Section 2 to read
"December 31 of each previous vacation credit year."

But

the word "previous" is not now found in Section 2 whereas
it is found in Section 5.

The only logical conclusion is that

those two phrases in each Section mean different points in
time.

The latter, so far as the instant grievance is con-

cerned, means the year 1967, and the former, the disputed
clause herein, must mean December 31 of the current year in
which the vacation is taken.

Or, so far as this grievance

is concerned, December 31, 1968.

- 5 Accordingly the Union's interpretation is upheld and
the affected employees are entitled to additional vacation.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
r

International Association of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers, District #64
and
Brown & Sharpe Manufacturing Co.

f

'
i
'
i
'
i

Award

In accordance with Article XII of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated October 25, 1967 between Brown &
Sharpe Manufacturing Co., hereinafter referred to as the
"Company," and International Association of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers, District #64, hereinafter referred to as
the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the grievances of Thomas H0 Hennessy
and Andrew B. Lambert, and two contract interpretation issues
(referred to as Items 2 and 5 in the American Arbitration
Association letter of November 27, 1968.)
Hearings were held at the Company plant in North Kingston,
Rhode Island on November 22, 1968 and January 13, 1969. The
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath.
During the course of the first hearing on November 22,
1968, the grievance of Thomas H. Hennessy was settled by and
between the parties and withdrawn from arbitration.
Prior to the commencement of the second hearing on
January 13, 1969 Items 2 and 5 were settled by and between
the parties and withdrawn from arbitration.
With regard to the grievance of Andrew B 0 Lambert, I
find and hold that Mr. Lambert, hereinafter referred to as

- 2 the "grievant," has abandoned his grievance.
failed to appear at the first hearing.

The grievant

At the request of the

Union his grievance was continued until the second hearing.
Though he was given due notice, the grievant again failed
to appear at the second hearing.

I find the Union has done

all it can in an effort to present the grievant's case in
arbitration, but that absence of the grievant at the two
scheduled hearings made presentation impossible.

Also I hold

that, under that circumstance, the Company need not be subjected further to that grievance.
Accordingly, the Union's request for a further continuance of the grievant's case is denied, and the Company's
motion that his grievance be dismissed, is granted.
However, consistent with the settlement of the Hennessy
grievance, I recommend that Mr. Lambert be afforded an opportunity to transform his discharge into a resignation.

I

recommend that if he submits his written resignation within
thirty days from the date of the Award, the Company accept
it in place of, and effective as of the date of his discharge,
In addition to the foregoing ruling dismissing the
grievance, I presented this recommendation orally to the
parties during the course of the second hearing and the Company expressed its willingness to accept it.

Eric
Arbitrator

- 3 -

DATED: January 16, 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

ss,

On this 16th day of January, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
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OFFICE OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, ADMINISTRATOR
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
'
i

Office of Labor Relations, City of New York,
on behalf of the Fire Department of the
City of New York

'
'
'
t
'
?

and
Uniformed Firefighter's Association
Local Union #94, AFL-CIO

Award

;

'
?

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Issue No. 1.
The Employer's elimination of Ambulance #3
was not proper. It shall be restored to service on the same regular basis as obtained
from August 1963 to December 1968„
Issue No. 2
Without prejudice to the Union's right to
complain when and if a specific order under
Section 3.8.3 of the All Units Circular #147
is issued, the bare content of that Section
and the statement of the Chief of Department
as to how it may be applied, do not enlarge
the firemen's job description in violation
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Eric £. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December
1969
STATE OF New York
)ss. :
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same0
Case No. A-63-69
Case No. A-64-69

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
i

Office of Labor Relations, City of New York, '
on behalf of the Fire Department of the
'
City of New York
'
and

'

Uniformed Firefighter's Association
Local Union #94, AFL-CIO

'

Opinion

The Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issues:
1.

Was the Employer's elimination of Ambulance #3
proper? If not, what shall be the remedy?

2.

Does the content and interpretation
Circular #147 enlarge the Firemen's
tion in violation of the Collective
Agreement? If so, what shall be the

of all Units
job descripBargaining
remedy?

A hearing was held at the office of Labor Relations on
November 17, 1969 at which time representatives of the above
named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath was expressly waived.
Issue No. 1

Ambulance #3 was placed in service in August, 1963,
primarily to provide first aid and ambulance transportation
for injured firemen from the scene of fires to hospitals in
Queens County.

It performed this work, together with certain

collateral services until December, 1968 when eliminated by
the Fire Department.

Thereafter coverage of Queens County

was included as part of the work of Ambulance #2 which previously worked in Kings and Richmond Counties.
#2 now covers all three boroughs.

Ambulance

- 2 -

The Employer asserts that Ambulance #3 was eliminated because it is no longer needed and there is little work for the
firemen who man it full time.

It points to a marked statistic-

al fall off in the number of firemen treated during the year
1968 and argues that the work previously performed by Ambulance
#3 has been assumed without difficulty by the Department's
Ambulance #2 and other ambulances attached to hospitals in
Queens County.
The Union disputes both the accuracy and significance of
the Employer's statistics and protests the abolition of what
it claims to be a protected benefit enjoyed by the firemen for
over five years.
Based on the record before me I conclude that Ambulance
#3 was placed in service as a result of a bilateral agreement
between the Employer and the Union, for which the firemen
gave a specific consideration and which, because of the particular circumstances involved, may not now be unilaterally
terminated by the Employer.
The uncontradicted evidence discloses that as a result of
discussions between the Employer and the Union, (initiated by
the former) the ambulance was purchased by the Union's Welfare
Fund (made up only of firemen contributions); and that over its
years of service from 1963 to the near end of 1968 no
discussions, during subsequent contract negotiations or at any
other time, took place between the parties regarding its use.
There is no doubt that Ambulance #3 represents a benefit
to the firemen.

No matter how many or few firemen it attended,

- 3 its availability to handle actual or potential injuries was a
tangible service to the employees.

It may well be that

Ambulance #2 has and will continue to be able to cover the
work previously done by Ambulance #3, together with its previously assigned work in Kings and Richmond Counties.

But

from the standpoint of quick and efficient handling of potential injuries, especially where the incident rate of fires has
and continues to increase, a single ambulance responding to
fires in three boroughs cannot be deemed an equal replacement
for an ambulance geographically limited to Queens.

According-

ly, though statistically Ambulance #2 has so far been able to
meet the needs of Queens County, I cannot conclude that it is
as good a protective device as would be the case if Ambulance
#3 was still in service.
It is neither my intention nor within my authority to
rule that the Employer may not under any circumstances unilaterally discontinue a mutually agreed upon benefit.

Rather, I

find that in this case where the ambulance was bought by the
firemen at the Employer's request, there is a presumption in
favor of its continuation unless the conditions under which
it was established have so markedly changed as to make its continuation unnecessary or unreasonable.

And in view of the ab-

sence of any question of its continued use, during subsequent
contract negotiations or over the five years of its service,
the Union had good reason to believe the ambulance would
continue to operate on that basis.
The Employer's contentions are not inconsistent with this
theory.

It claims that the conditions which originally

justified Ambulance #3 are no longer present.
this score is vulnerable for two reasons.

But its case on

- 4 First, there is no evidence that the

agreement to establish

Ambulance #3 contained, as a condition of its continued use,
any proviso regarding the number of fires to which it would
respond or the number of employees to be treated.

Indeed,

the very nature of the work of this type of vehicle subjects
any estimates of its actual or potential use, to wide
variations.
As I see it, the ambulance was established not for the
purpose of attending a certain specified number of fires or
to service any specified number of firemen, but rather to be
available in Queens County to respond to fires and to service
injured firemen when and if such service was needed, irrespective of the quantity.

In short, I do not find that the

elimination of the ambulance was to be triggered by any
fortunate decrease in injuries, especially when the realistic
potential of an upswing in injuries from the increased number
of fires, remains so manifest.

Second, the Employer's

statistics are incomplete and hence not conclusive.

In 1967

Ambulance #3 handled about as much work as did Ambulance #1
and #2 and placed second amongst the three, in the number of
firemen treated.

The 1968 statistics offered in evidence by

the Employer show a substantial fall-off in the work of
Ambulance #3.

But I cannot conclude that this represents any

significant or accurate trend.

Uncontradicted is the Union's

testimony that the 1968 statistics for Ambulance #3 represent
only seven of the eleven relevant months of that year, because
it was used elsewhere, outside of Queens for four months.

If

in service throughout 1968 (until December when discontinued)

- 5Ambulance #3 might well have compiled a statistical record
equal or close to those of Ambulances #1 and #2.
Also the questionable reliability of any such statistics
as a measurement of future work was recognized by Chief
Hartnett, the Employer's personnel officer.

In his memorandum

of November 13, 1969 setting forth the work statistics of
Ambulances #1, #2 and #2, for 1967 through 1969, he stated
"the trends are not significant."

To my mind this means that

because of the rising number of fires and the unpredictability
of injuries which may result, any prospective calculation of
this use of the ambulances (including Ambulance #3 if it had
been continued) would be speculative at best.

So I am unable

to conclude that the conditions under which Ambulance #3 was
placed in service in 1963 have so markedly changed as to justify its elimination, unilaterally by the Employer,
For all the foregoing reasons the Employer's elimination
of Ambulance #3 was not proper.

It shall be restored to

service on the same regular basis as obtained from August 1963
to December 1968.
Issue No. 2
All units Circular #147 effective July 15, 1968 and as
amended April 1, 1969 contained the following provision:
3.8.3 CO CMDR may utilize Co. personnel as necessary
to perform clerical duties in units in connection
with FP duty.
The Union contends that this provision as written, together with a statement by the Chief of Department as to how
it may be implemented, is contrary to and hence violative of

- 6Article V Schedule A, Section 2 c of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement which reads;
Fire Prevention Operations
Under normal supervision of company officers a
fireman, individually or collectively with other
firemen, performs inspectional, investigational,
educational and regulative duties in the area
of fire prevention operations. These activities
involve separate procedures and the making of decisions requiring individual judgment but in
accordance with prescribed methods and procedures
and/or direction of immediate superiors,, This
shall include but is not limited to -

a
b
c
d
• • • ••

This shall exclude but is not limited to -

a
b
c Clerical, other than those specifically related to required duties.
The Union claims that under 3.8.3 of all Units Circular
#147 the Employer intends to assign to firemen a wide range
of clerical duties in connection with fire prevention work
which will exceed the bounds of "those specifically related
to required duties."
The Union complaint is premature.

It cites no specific

circumstance in which a clerical duty order was given any
fireman under Section 3.8.3 of the All Units Circular.

So

it is impossible for me to determine whether that provision
of the circular was implemented in any way inconsistent with
or in violation of the contractual job description and limitations therein.

- 7 As I see it the Union is worried that Section 3.8.3 of
the circular, as gratuitously interpreted by the Chief of the
Department, may produce a work assignment violative of the
job description.

But so far as the record before me is con-

cerned, this has not yet occurred.

And until it does, I find

no adversary dispute between the parties.

Section 3.8.3 of

the Circular as worded may be the basis for orders consistent
with or in violation of the contractual job description.
Which, depends upon how it is applied and implemented.

But

until applied or implemented improperly, the Union has no complaint0
Accordingly without prejudice to the Union's rights to
complain when and if a specific order under Section 3.8.3 of
the All Units Circular #147 is issued, the bare content of
that Section and the statement of the Chief of Department as
to how it may be applied, do not enlarge the firemen's job
description in violation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Local 282 I.B.T.
and

Award

Clearview Concrete Pipe Corp.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1969
and having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The discharge of Alex Kobusky is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated
without back pay. The period of time between
his discharge and his reinstatement shall be
deemed a disciplinary suspension and so noted
on his employment record.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: May
1969
STATE OF New York
)ss .
COUNTY OF NEW YORK ) "
On this
day of May, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same0
Case No. 1330 0143 69
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In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Local 282 I.B.T.

'

and

'

Clearview Concrete Pipe Corp.

Opinion

'

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Alex Kobusky? If not what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on March 26 and April 9, 1969, at
which time Mr. Kobusky, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant," and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company, hereinafter referred to as the "parties," appeared.
Full opportunity was afforded the grievant and the parties
to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.
The grievant was discharged for "damaging vehicles."
Initially, I do not find any meaningful procedural defect in the Company's action.

The contract calls for notice

to the Union before an employee is fired.

Obviously, this

is designed to provide the Union with the facts as viewed
by the Company, and to afford the Union an opportunity to
adequately represent the employee involved.

Though in the

instant case notice to the Union prior to the discharge was
not given, I do not find that the purposes of such notice
were at all frustrated.

The Company informed the Union

representative of the grievant's discharge shortly after the

- 2discharge was effectuated,,

The Company fully explained the

reason for its action; and the grievant and the Union on his
behalf were given adequate opportunity to protest. Accordingly I find that procedurally the Company complied substantially with that section of the contract, so that its omission
of notice to the Union before the formal discharge, is not a
fatal defect„
Substantively the Company claims that on November 29,
1968, while parking his fully loaded International truck in
an "aisle" (which the Company states was a prohibited parking
area), the grievant backed into a Brockway truck pushing it
backwards several feet, badly damaging its fender and bumper.
So far as this record is concerned there were no eye witnesses
to the accident.

It was reported to the Company by the driver

of the Brockway who discovered it later in the same day,
when he returned to his truck to retrieve some apparel.
The Company contends that the penalty of discharge was
appropriate because this accident was the grievant's third,,
Earlier in July of the same year he tore a fender while driving a Company truck and in September caused a trailer to become stuck in a sand pit at a construction site which he entered contrary to standard operating instructions, and which
resulted in damage to the trailer's drive shaft.

There is no

serious dispute over the occurrence of these two earlier incidents.
Based on the weight of the evidence I am persuaded that
the grievant was responsible for the third accident as well.
"

But I conclude that because the Company did not make it clear

- 3 to the grievant after the first or second accident that discipline including discharge would be imposed if a further
accident occurred, the penalty of discharge in this case was
precipitant and therefore is modified to a disciplinary suspension.
Several factors point to the grievant's responsibility
for the damage to the Brockway.

His International

truck was

parked in front of the Brockway, and there is no dispute that
he parked it there.

It is also obvious that the damage to the

Brockway was caused by the International.

Only the latter,

fully loaded as it was with beams, with its size and weight,
could push the Brockway truck the several feet backwards
causing tire skid marks on the roadway.
to do so.

And it was positioned

Also the record discloses that paint from the newly

painted Brockway was seen on one of the tire flaps of the
International

indicating impact between the two vehicles. Con-

sidering these facts, it is apparent that the International
pushed into the Brockway rather than visa versa.
The grievant does not deny the accident.
it "could have happened."
happening."

He stated that

But that he "does not remember it

He does not deny that the Brockway was parked in

the aisle when he backed in, but rather that he did not see
any other vehicle in the aisleway.
should be much more unequivocal.

It seems to me that he
An accident of this type,

with this magnitude of impact (causing the Brockway to be
pushed several feet backwards) is not something one does not
remember.

Certainly if it happened, the grievant would have a

]

}
vivid recollection of it.

And on the other hand if it did not

- 5 Within the frame of that rule neither purpose was attempted
by the Company or afforded the grievant in this case. Following the accidents in July and September he was not decisively
warned either orally or in writing that such accidents would
not be tolerated.

He was not told that discipline would be

imposed if he continued to have accidents.

He was not told

either orally or in writing that he would be fired if he
caused accidents in the future.
"to be more careful."

All that he was told was

The Company witnesses conceded that

this was the extent of its displeasure made known to him.
This is not to say that discharge is not a proper penalty for
accidents to vehicles.

Clearly an employer may discharge an

employee who causes damage to Company equipment.

But absent

a rule or contract provision calling for summary dismissal, discharge for damage of the types involved in this case requires
a proper foundation by notice and warning.

The torn fender

in July was not in and of itself grounds for discharge, but
a formal warning either orally or in writing was clearly
appropriate.

If the Company so warned the grievant at that

time, he would have been put on notice that future vehicle
damage would not be tolerated.

He would have known not only

"to be more careful" but that his failure to do so would result
in more severe discipline.
Again in September, the Company had an opportunity to admonish the grievant in a way that would have made it clear he
was in danger of losing his job.

If discharge was not then

appropriate (and it may well have been sustainable then if a
warning had followed the July accident) the Company could have

- 6 imposed a disciplinary suspension.

At least it should have

warned him unmistakably that further damage would result in
his dismissal.

Had the Company followed that procedure I

would have had no trouble upholding the discharge in this
case.

But absent that foundation I judge the discharge pen-

alty to be inconsistent with the principle of progressive
discipline which, as I have indicated, I find to be particularly applicable to the facts in this case.
Accordingly the grievant's record warrants a disciplinary penalty in the form of a suspension.
changed to that penalty.
back pay.

His discharge is

He shall be reinstated but without

The period of time from his discharge to his re-

instatement shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension and so
noted on his employment record.

He is warned, and this

Award is notice, that future negligent acts causing damage to
vehicles or other offenses would, in my opinion, be grounds
for his immediate dismissal.

Eric y. Schmertz
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 376, United Automobile Workers
of America
Award

and
Colt's Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated August 5, 1967 and having been
duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The discharge of Norman Hardacker was precluded
by a prior settlement and therefore not for just
cause. He shall be reinstated with back pay less
any money he earned in gainful employment since
the date of his termination.

Eric J< Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED:

July

1969

STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

ss. :

On this
day of July, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case No. 12 30 0032 69
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In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
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r

Local 376, United Automobile Workers
of America
and
C o l t ' s Inc.

'
'
i
'

Opinion
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In accordance with Article XV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated August 5, 1967 between Colt's Inc. hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 376 United Automobile Workers of America, hereinafter referred to as the
"Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to
hear and decide the following stipulated issue;
Did the Company have just cause for the discharge
of Norman Hardacker? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Hartford,
Connecticut on May 2, 1969, at which time Mr. Hardacker, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of
the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the
"parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to
offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.

The parties filed post hearing briefs and the hear-

ings were declared closed as of June 19, 1969.
The grievant was discharged for assaulting a fellow employee, one John Lewis, Jr., in violation of Company Rule #9b.
The grievant threw the contents of a soda bottle at Lewis and
then kicked him. The grievant does not deny the act but
claims Lewis provoked him and that he acted in self defense0

- 2 Lewis denies that he acted in any way to lead the grievant to
believe he had to defend himself.
I need not resolve the sharply contradictory and conflicting testimony regarding the allegations of provocation because
I find a proper resolution of this case on procedural grounds.
There is no dispute over the propriety of the Company
rule.

It has been in existence for an extended number of

years.

Its reasonableness is manifest, not only on the gener-

ally well settled principles of industrial relations, but
specifically because of the nature of the Company's product firearms and live ammunition.

Also it was promulgated in a

manner that meets all the well established conditions for enforcement.

It was prepared in written form, disseminated

amongst the employees, made available to each new hire including the grievant, and was and has been posted conspicuously.
And there is no dispute that it was accepted by the Union0
So there is no question that the Company has the authority
to discharge an employee who commits an assault.

But though

the Company has this clear right, it may, either expressly or
by conduct waive it, or settle a dispute over which it could
be invoked on a basis less than the imposition of the discharge penalty0

And if there be a waiver or settlement, the

Company is thereby bound, and may not thereafter discharge
the offender, even if at the outset it may have had grounds
to do so.

This latter circumstance is what I conclude is in-

volved in the instant case.
Rule #9b as extracted from the written Company Rules,
together with the introductory language setting forth the

- 3 authority of the "Supervisory Force" reads:
Members of the Supervisory Force, having authority
over the employees of the Company, will take disciplinary action in accordance with the facts and
conditions surrounding each individual case. This
disciplinary action, may, at the discretion of the
supervisor, be any of the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Immediate discharge
Suspension
Demotion
Written warning
Verbal warning

The following are offenses which are reasons for action:

9. Conduct contrary to common decency
or moralty, such as:
b. Assault with intent to injure.
The rule is clear and so is the authority of the supervisor.

He has the authority and discretion to determine which

penalty shall be imposed.

No doubt he exercises this discretion-

ary authority depending upon the seriousness of the offense.
But under the clear language of the rule, it is the supervisor
who is empowered to act.

And so far as the most severe penalty

is concerned, it is not simply that of "discharge" but rather
the power of "immediate discharge."
The record before me discloses that the supervisory force
failed to invoke the rule as written, and beyond that consummated a settlement that constituted a waiver of any later
resort to the discharge penalty.
I am persuaded that responsible and authorized supervisors,
together with the Union steward, the grievant and the assaulted
employee, reached a final and satisfactory understanding.

-

Or

- 4at least the supervisory force acted in such a manner as to
reasonably lead the Union and the grievant to believe that a
settlement had been achieved.
Shortly after the assault Supervisor Wells called a meeting in his office at which another supervisor, Mr. Bryan; the
Union steward, Mr. Harding; the grievant, the assaulted employee and some others were present.

As a result of that meet-

ing the grievant expressed apologies to Lewis; they shook
hands; and both were permitted to return to work for the balance of the shift.

The steward asked Supervisors Wells and

Bryan whether they "were satisfied" and whether "that settled
it."

The testimony discloses that Messrs. Wells and Bryan

either gave their assent or said nothing.

But there is no evi-

dence that they responded negatively to the steward's question
or reserved their option to impose or recommend a disciplinary
penalty later.

The supervisors did not testify in refutation

on this point.
The grievant was not discharged until the day after the
incident, and then by the Company's Vice President for Personnel.

The Company explains that the supervisors did not

fire the grievant at the time of the assault because they lacked the authority to do so - as only the industrial relations
and personnel department possesses that power.

This may be

so as a matter of internal policy and procedure between and
amongst the supervisory and executive personnel of the Company,
But the rule explicitly provides to the contrary.

It states

that the power to discharge, indeed immediately, is vested
with the supervisor.

Therefore despite any variation there-

- 5 from within the ranks of management, the Union, its steward
and the grievant were entitled to believe that supervisors
were authorized to effectuate discipline, including discharge,
and logically therefore, were similarly authorized to resolve
any dispute on a lesser basis.

For there can be no real

quarrel with the conclusion that if, as the rules provide, a
supervisor has the power to fire offending employees, he is
equally cloaked with the apparent authority to waive that power
or to reach a settlement without exercising that power, both
of which bind the Company.
I am satisfied that the results of the meeting in Supervisor Wells' office amounted to an authoritative decision by
the supervisors to waive the imposition of the discharge penalty.

That it was limited as they contend, merely to the main-

tenance of tranquility between the two employees so that both
could work the balance of the shift without any further danger,
is not persuasive.

For if they intended all along to recommend

discipline or discharge, there was no reason whatsoever for the
grievant to be continued on the job for the balance of the
shift, nor was there any need to bring about or participate in
a rapproachment between the two employees.

And if the super-

visors doubted their authority to fire the grievant forthwith,
but wished rather to conduct a further investigation together
with a recommendation to higher Company representatives, they
could and should have ordered the grievant to punch out and
suspended him forthwith pending their investigation.

Either

course of action in my view, would have preserved the Company's
- right to impose discharge later.

That right might well have

- 6 been preserved also had the supervisors done nothing but report the events to higher management the next day for action.
As I see it, despite the rule for immediate discharge, a delay
until the next day pending an investigation and consideration
of higher management would be neither prejudicial to the grievant nor inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the rule.
Instead, the supervisors conducted what amounted to a grievance
meeting.

They heard both employees present their version of

the assault, with the presence of the shop steward.

And the

result of what they initiated -- the grievant's apology, the
handshake between the two employees, and either the supervisors'
assent or the failure to disclaim in response to the steward's
assumption that a resolution had been achieved, can be construed only as an authoritative settlement.
Accordingly, though the Company may have had grounds to
discharge the grievant if it had acted pursuant to its own
rule, the action of the supervisors constituted a waiver of
that right.

And that waiver in the form of a settlement serves

as a bar to the Company's subsequent attempt, the following
day to impose the discharge penalty.
For the foregoing reasons the discharge of Norman Hardacker was improper.

He shall be reinstated with back pay less

any money he earned in gainful employment since the date of
his termination.

Eric/O. Schmertz
Arbitrator

r

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
i

Community and Social Agency Employees
Union, Local 1707, American Federation
of State, County and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO

'
'
'
'
i
'
i

and
Council of Jewish Federations and
Welfare Funds, Inc.

Award

'
"

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
The discharge of Jacob Goldfein is reduced to a
disciplinary suspension. He shall be reinstated
forthwith but without back pay. The period of
time between his discharge and his reinstatement
shall be deemed a disciplinary suspension and
shall be so noted in his employment record. He
shall not receive the salary increment scheduled
for January 1, 1970 under Article XVIII of the
contract until, following his reinstatement he
completes an amount of active service equal to
the period of his suspension. In subsequent years,
for additional salary increments or adjustments,
under the contract, his anniversary date shall be
as of January 1.
Eric J/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December /f 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)sg .
)

On this /f day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 107, International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO
Award

and
D'Armigene, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and dated March 15, 1967, as extended May
1969 to July 14, 1972 and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Sandra Byer is not doing production work in violation of Article IX Section 2 of the contract,,

Eric Jr. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: December
1969
STATE OF New York
)
COUNTY OF New York
) "
On this
day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case No. A69-1373

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 107, International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO

and

Opinion

D'Armigene, Inc.

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement dated March 15, 1967, as extended May 1969 to July 14, 1972, between D'Armigene, Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and Local 107,
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide the following
stipulated issue:
Is Sandra Byer doing production work in violation of Article IX Section 2 of the contract?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on November 25, 1969, at which time representatives of the Union and Company, hereinafter referred to
jointly as the "parties," appeared, and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the

Arbitrator's oath.
The Union contends that Mrs. Byer is doing bargaining
unit production work and that she and the work that she is
performing belong within the Union's jurisdiction.
The Company asserts that the work performed by Mrs. Byer

- 2is not production work within the meaning of Article IX Section 2 of the contract; that at the time of the NLRB certification election in 1963 and over the years thereafter, including the negotiation of the current contract extention, this
work was excluded from the bargaining unit.

The Company ar-

gues therefore that the Union is seeking in this proceeding
what it failed to achieve when certified, and during subsequent negotiations.
The evidence supports the Company's position.

The dis-

puted work involves cutting samples; recutting mistakes,
special custom orders (as to size and fit), and similar work
in connection with small quantity orders.

Article II reads:

UNION RECOGNITION
The bargaining unit covered by this Agreement
consists of all non-supervisory cutting workers
(cutters and examiners) employed by the Employer.
It is agreed that the Union represents a majority of such workers and that it shall be the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative for
all workers in the bargaining unit during the entire period of this Agreement. Neither the Employer nor any of its agents shall directly or
indirectly discourage membership in the Union.
and Article IX Section 2 provides:
DISTRIBUTION OF WORK

2. No member of the Employer or supervisory employee or designer or any person outside the
bargaining unit shall perform any work in
any job covered by this Agreement, except in
cases of emergency.
But neither in 1963 when the Union was recognized, nor
at any time thereafter has the disputed work been performed
by "cutting department workers."
ed in the cutting department.

Nor has it ever been locat-

In 1963 the disputed work was

- 3done by one Helen Skuderna.

She was challenged by the Union

when she attempted to vote in the certification election. That
challenge was upheld by the Labor Board.

I am satisfied that

the Union's challenge relating as it did to Miss Skuderna's
supervisory status, also established the work which she was
performing as outside the jurisdiction of the "non-supervisory cutting department."

At that time the disputed work was

performed at an entirely different plant than the one in
which the cutting department was located.
Thereafter, before Mrs. Byer assumed the work, it was
performed by one Mary Rubbo, also a non-bargaining unit employee.

And following the consolidation of the Company's New

York City and Long Island plants, it was still not located in
the cutting department, but rather in a "sample room" in a
different wing of the building.

The Union neither objected to

nor grieved Mrs. Rubbo's status, nor claimed the work she did.
Mrs. Byer, following a period of work on production items
in the cutting department during the first 30 days of her employment (which the Company concedes involved work within the
Union's jurisdiction) thereafter assumed the disputed work in
the sample room.
Based on the evidence before me I am satisfied that the
latter work is not the same as what she did during her earlier
employment in the cutting department.

Instead, her subsequent

assignment encompassed the very same work which had previously
been performed by Skuderna and Rubbo.

And again it was locat-

ed in the "sample room,1' separate and apart from the cutting
department.

- 4In 1969 when the contract was extended following the
strike of that year, the Union demanded that Mrs. Byer and
another employee, one Cordillo, be added to the bargaining
unit.

The Company agreed to place Cordillo and his work

within the unit but not Mrs. Byer.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that there is a significant difference between the large quantity production
work handled by the bargaining unit employees in the cutting
department and the special, custom, or sample orders which
have been the responsibility of non-bargaining unit employees
since inception of the Union since 1963.

I conclude also that

the work performed by Mrs. Byer and claimed by the Union in
this proceeding, is of the latter type.

And that at the time

of the Union's certification, during contract administration
thereafter, and in the course of the contract extension negotiations, this work was neither included in nor intended as
work belonging to the non-supervisory cutting department workers.

Accordingly, its performance by a non-bargaining unit

employee is not violative of Articles II or IX of the contract.
Per force, inclusion of the disputed work within the bargaining unit is a matter for negotiation and not arbitration.

^
£< . Schmertz g
Eric
Arbitrator

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Deer Park Teachers Association
and
Deer Park Board of Education

In accordance with Article XV of the contract dated
June 21, 1968 between the Deer Park Board of Education, hereinafter referred to as the "Board," and Deer Park Teachers
Association, hereinafter referred to as the "Association,"
the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and
decide, under the conditions set forth in the 3rd Stage-Advisory Arbitration of Article XV, the following stipulated issue:
Was there a violation of Article VI Section 1 of
the contract when the Board assigned a teacher
hired for a science position (which was posted as
a notice of a vacancy) to the job of a Junior
High School physical education teacher (which was
not posted as a vacancy) in the JFK Junior High
School.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association on August 4, 1969 at which time representatives
of the Board and the Association, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties," appeared and were afforded full opportunity to present their respective cases.
During the course of the hearing the Arbitrator stated to
the parties that the issue in dispute appeared to be potentially
moot.

He suggested therefore that the parties might wish to

make an effort to resolve the dispute between them.

Thereafter,

- 2in accordance with the Arbitrator's suggestion, the parties
met together in private without the Arbitrator's participation
or presence.
As a result of that meeting the parties advised the
Arbitrator that they have agreed to terminate this proceeding
without prejudice to their respective positions in the event
that a future similar controversy should arise.

Eric 3/ Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: August '3 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
)

On this sday of August, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

Case No. 1330 0543 69

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and

Award

De Luxe General Laboratories, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and dated October 1, 1968 and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties, Awards
as follows:
The grievance in case #69A-2 does not fall within Section 17 (c) of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement. Accordingly the Union's claim regarding the present operation of the machines during
lunch is denied.
The Arbitrator's fee in this case shall be borne
by the Union.

Arbitrator

DATED: April
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

ss. :

On this
day of April, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,
Case #69A-2

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and
De Luxe General Laboratories, Inc.

'
'
i
'
'
T
'

Opinion

'
t

The stipulated issue is:
Does Grievance 69A-2 fall within Section 17(c)
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement?
It is stipulated that if the Arbitrator decides
that question in the negative, the Union's claim
regarding the present operation of the machines
during lunch is denied. If answered in the
affirmative, the parties shall negotiate conditions for the operation of the machines during
lunch as provided by Section 17 (c).
A hearing was held at the Company offices on February 28,
1969 at which time representatives of the parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties

filed post hearing briefs.
The machines in question are three Duplex color positive
developing machines.

The question for determination is

whether certain changes in equipment on those machines which
have occurred since the Award of Arbitrator Joseph E. McMahon
in case #67A-25, dated August 23, 1967, together with the
changes which were before him in that proceeding, make the
Duplex machines new, unusual and reconstructed equipment or
accelerated within the meaning of Section 17 (c) of the contract.
There is no dispute that since the McMahon Award the
machines have not been accelerated beyond the speed of 175,

- 2which that Award held to be normal under the terms of the
contract.

So there has been no new acceleration in the

speed of the machines, which standing alone, would now warrant the application of Section 17 (c) of the contract.

The

main thrust of the Union's argument is one of cumulative
effect.

It argues that the accelerated speed of the mach-

ines plus the other changes weighed by Mr. McMahon, together
with subsequent changes in certain parts of the machines,
transform those machines into new, unusual and/or reconstructed equipment.
I have considered the changes which were before Mr. McMahon
when he denied the Union's request for an increase in the
Duplex machine crew complement, namely:
1. The increase in machine speed from ].50 to 175.
2. An increase in the temperature of the developing solution.
3. Extra requirements of the IBM cards.
4. Extra supplies entailed in the use of "black
bags," and dimmer lights.
5. Extreme difficulty in making double splices;
together with the changes subsequent thereto, namely:
1. Alteration of the film feed mechanism from
sprocket gears to a friction system
2. Installation of a different type gear clutch.
3. A change in the position of the gear clutch.
4. Installation of a jet spray washer ("bird bath")
5. Installation of a squeege film drying system;
and I have concluded that the overall and basic function
and operation of the Duplex machines, which are of 1955

- 3 vintage remain fundamentally unchanged, and consequently do
not constitute new, unusual or reconstructed equipment within the meaning of Section 17 (c) of the contract.
Accordingly the Union's grievance in case #69A-2 is
denied.

Eric jfi. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

i:y
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
"

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A0T.S.E.

"
"

and

"

De Luxe General, Inc.

Award

"

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The 40 hour cumulative guarantee on a five clay
basis at straight time under Section 18 is a
right and privilege to which the grievants are
entitled. Therefore, the grievants, Messrs.
Robert Rubinstein, Edward Hauch and Martin Garrett
should have been paid that guarantee for the days
Monday through Friday of the week in which Washington' s Birthday fell in the year 1969. And in
addition, under Section 5 of the contract, they
are entitled to holiday pay for Washington's
Birthday. Therefore they should receive a total
of 6 days pay for that week. The Company is directed to make the appropriate payment.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the Company.

ErTc^C Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: September
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss.:
)

On this
day of September, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case #69-A9

II

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

"
"
n
"
"
M
"
M
"
n

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and
De Luxe General, Inc.

Opinion

The issue as stipulated by the parties is:
Are the three grievants, Robert Rubinstein,
Edward Hauch and Martin Garrett entitled to
8 hours pay for Washington's Birthday 1969?
Hearings were held at the American Arbitration Association and the Laboratory on June 18 and 20, 1969, at which time
representatives of the parties appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's oath and the con-

tract time limit for rendition of the Award were waived and
the parties filed post hearing briefs.
The parties recognize that as worded, the issue does not
precisely define the dispute. Actually the grievants, who are
Negative Developers on the midnight shift, received 8 hours
pay for Washington's Birthday 1969.

But they received only a

total of only 40 hours pay for the week in which that holiday
fell, because, though the holiday fell on Saturday of that
week, the Laboratory worked only four of the week days (Monday
through Thursday).

The issue in dispute involves the Union's

claim on behalf of the grievants for a sixth day of pay for
that week, on the theory that the grievants were entitled to
a guarantee of 40 hours work and pay, Monday through Friday,

- 2 whether or not the Laboratory worked each of those days, plus
holiday pay for the holiday which fell on Saturday.

So, more

accurately the issue is:
Are the grievants entitled to a sixth day of pay
(of 8 hours) for the week in which Washington's
Birthday 1969 fell?
Under Section 5 of the contract, Washington's Birthday is
an enumerated holiday for which employees shall be paid without being required to work, provided they report for work any
day during the week in which it fell.

What is pertinent is

Paragraph (b) thereof which reads:
Should any of the foregoing holidays fall on a
Saturday, employees shall be paid an extra day's
pay for the week in which said Saturday holiday
falls.
The Union contends that the grievants are "weekly employees;" that as such they enjoy a guaranteed work week of 40
hours; and that therefore for the week in question their compensation should total that basic guarantee plus the extra day's
pay for that week for Washington's Birthday which fell on Saturday - or in other words a total of six days pay0
The Company concedes that the grievants are "weekly employees" but not among those weekly employees guaranteed 40
hours work or pay; that the Company has the right to operate
its Laboratory on less than a five day week basis; that the
grievants are entitled to pay only for time worked; and therefore the total pay they received for the four days worked that
week plus the holiday pay equalled their full entitlement.
As I see it the pertinent contract provisions are
Section 12(a) and (e), and Section 18.

The former read:

- 3 12.

Weekly and Hourly Employees:
(a) nothing herein contained shall be deemed
to have modified the rights and privileges
presently enjoyed by weekly employees. Employer shall not change the status of any employee
from weekly to hourly or from hourly to weekly without the Union's consent.
(e) Employees on negative developing operations shall not be paid for time absent, but
the pay so deducted shall be divided equally
among the remaining employees of the operating
crew affected by said absence.

and the latter:
18.

Newsreel Makeup.
The present night crew engaged in Negative
Developing, Positive Developing, Make-up News
Timers and Make-up News Printers at De Luxe
will operate on the basis of a six-hour minimum daily call and a 40 hour cumulative guarantee on a five-day basis at straight time.

Though the Company concedes that certain "weekly employees11, specifically certain senior Timers, Titlemen and similarly highly skilled employees, enjoy a full week's pay guarantee whether the Laboratory works a full week or not, it
argues that the only contractual guarantee to the grievants
is the apportionment under Section 12(e) of the pay of an
absent Negative Developer among the employees of the crew
who report for work and who are affected by the absence.

From

this the Company concludes that the grievafcts are entitled to
pay only when they work and that no pay attaches to days
they are absent whether or not they are absent on their own
initiative,

- 4 or as here, because the Company decided to close the Laboratory,,

And Section 18 is considered inapplicable by the Com-

pany because the "newsreel work" under which it is headed, is
no longer part of the Company's business,,
The Union's interpretations are different.

It points

out that neither under Section 12 nor anywhere else in the
contract is there a distinction between "weekly employees"
such as Timers and Titlemen and the Negative Developers.

And

that absent any contractual distinction, it is improper for
the Company to accord a weekly guarantee to the former group
and deny it to the latter, especially in view of the explicit
language of Section 12(a).

Moreover the Union does not accept

the Company's interpretation of the word "absent" in Section
12(e).

It does not agree that an employee foreclosed from

working because the Laboratory has been closed, is "absent"
within the meaning of Section 12(e).

And consequently the

Union concludes that one of the "rights and privileges" presently enjoyed by the grievants, as weekly employees, is a
guarantee of pay except when they are absent within the meaning of Section 12(e) of the contract.
Alternatively the Union claims that the 40 hour weekly
guarantee as set forth in Section 18 of the contract is a
right and privilege which the grievants enjoy as weekly employees because they presently qualify under the conditions
and terms of that section; or, having undisputedly once been
covered by Section 18, they may not now be deprived of their
rights thereunder without the Union's consent to a change in
their status (per Section 12(a))even if the conditions of

- 5 Section 18 are now not present in the Laboratory.

Or in other

words, without the Union's consent any rights the grievants
enjoyed because of their work on "newsreel makeup" they shall
continue to enjoy as "weekly employees" whether or not there
has been a material change in the nature or quantity of the
Company's newsreel work.
In my view, the grievant's claim for a sixth day of pay
for the week in question, turns simply on whether they have a
guaranteed regular 40 hour work week.

If so they would be en-

titled to that guarantee for Monday through Friday of the week
in question, even though the Laboratory was closed on Friday;
plus a day's pay for Washington's Birthday which fell on Saturday „

If not, they were properly paid for the work perform-

ed plus the holiday.
I agree with the Union's interpretation of the word
"absent" in Section 12(e).

Since that Section draws a dis-

tinction between those members of the operating crew who are
at work, and any employee thereof who is "absent," it must
refer to the circumstances where the Laboratory is in operation and the "absent" employee is not at work due to his own
act, volition or incapacity.

But clearly it does not apply

to a circumstance where an employee is ready, willing and
able to come to work, but cannot do so because the Laboratory
has been closed.

This is not to say that under proper cir-

cumstances the Company does not have the right to close down
its operations; but rather that if it does so, it cannot claim
that the employees who are unable to work thereby are "absent"
within the meaning of Section 12(e).

But Section 12(a) and (e)

- 6 are not enough in and of themselves to substantiate the Union's
claim that the grievants, as "weekly employees," are entitled
to a full week's pay guarantee.

Rather, because Section

12(a)

only guarantees them a continuance of the rights and privileges
enjoyed by "weekly employees" and immunity from a change in
status without the Union's consent, the question of whether a
guaranteed work week is among those protected rights and privileges, remains unanswered by Section 12.
The only pertinent contract language on the matter of a
guaranteed work week is Section 18.

Therefore, in my judgment,

the grievants' right to any such guarantee over and above the
holiday pay depends on whether Section 18 applies to them.
There is no dispute that Section 18 once actively applied
to the grievants.

It was during the years that the Company

handled a large and regular volume of daily or twice weekly
newsreel makeup work.

At that time, as is now the case, the

grievants were members of the night crew, classified as Negative
Developers and worked at this Laboratory.

So as of May 23,

1966 when the present provisions of Section 12(a) and (e) were
negotiated the grievants did enjoy the weekly pay guarantee of
Section 18.

As "weekly employees" they were not then distin-

guished under that category from other "weekly employees" such
as Timers and Titlemen, etc.

The Company made the distinction

only when this type of newsreel work was either

discontinued

or fell off sharply, some time in January 1968.

The Company

then deemed that its obligations under Section 18 to the
Negative Developers were no longer applicable,,

Its present

- 7 position that Section 18 does not apply is based on the same
conclusion - that because there is no newsreel work of the
type and quantity previously in existence, the grievants, who
may have enjoyed rights thereunder during an earlier period and
under different circumstances, lost those rights when those
circumstances changed.
Factually the evidence supports the Company's assertion
that any present newsreel work is markedly different in type
and quantity from what the grievants handled prior to January
1968.

It is now a very small part of their regular assignments;

whereas previously it was a significant part of their work. It
appears that the total quantity of any work which could be
classified generally as "newsreel" involves no more than a
total of a few minutes over any four week period.

And while

this may well be a "newsreel" assignment I am not prepared to
conclude that it constitutes the type or quantity of the "newsreel makeup" work contemplated by Section 18.

Ordinary logic

might therefore produce a conclusion that the rights and benefits under Section 18 are vitiated by the absence of conditions
contemplated by that Section.

But I am constrained to find

that Section 12(a) of the contract dictates a different result.
Until January 1968 there is no dispute that the grievants
were covered by and enjoyed the benefits of Section 18, and
were as much "weekly employees" as any others so classified.
Under the contract in

effect in January 1968, when the Com-

pany's newsreel makeup work came to an end, Section 12(a) of
the contract was the same as it is now.

It meant then that

for the life of that contract there could be no modification

- 8 in the rights and privileges enjoyed by weekly employees and
any change in their status required the Union's consent.
It is undisputed that at no time during the remaining
months of that contract, following the end of the newsreel
work, did the Union consent to any change in the status of
any of the employees covered by Section 18.

So for the balance

of that contract, despite the significant change in the newsreel makeup work, the rights and privileges of the employees
under Section 18 and their status were not modified.

And I

am unable to find that there was any change thereafter during
the negotiations or following the execution of the present contract „

Section 12(a) was repeated in the present contract,

thereby preserving the rights and privileges that the grievants
and all other weekly employees enjoyed previously.

And their

previous status, unchanged because of the absence of any Union
consent, was similarly perpetuated.

Also,significantly I be-

lieve, Section 18 was repeated in the new contract, even
though the newsreel work under which it is headed, at least in
the Company's view, was terminated almost 11 months earlier,
I can only conclude that it found its way into the new agreement, not just to substantively cover the possibility of a resumption of the newsreel work, or as a mere oversight, but as
a continued recognition of the fact that the certain enumerated employees thereunder enjoyed rights protected by Section
12(a), which had not been changed over the 11 month period between the predecessor contract and the present agreement, nor
changed under the current contract because the Union had not
consented to any change in the status of those employees„

- 9In short, the change in the newsreel work was not enough
to change their status, simply because Section 12 (a) requires
the Union's consent to effectuate that change; and from the
time that Section 18 did apply, there has been no such consent.
And obviously, for an employee's status to be maintained, there
can be no diminution or deprivation of any of the rights or
privileges which attach to that status.
Therefore though the condition for which Section 18 was
originally intended may no longer be present, the rights and
status of the employees, including the grievants, which they
acquired thereunder when it was actively applicable, are maintained not only by the continued inclusion of Section 18 in
the present contract, but by the express protection of Section
12(a).
Accordingly the grievants are entitled to the 40 hour
cumulative guarantee on a 5 day basis at straight time set
forth in Section 18, and should have received 5 days pay for
Monday through Friday of the week in which Washington's Birthday fell on a Saturday, and in addition they should have received holiday pay for Saturday as a sixth day.

The Company

is directed to make payment thereof.

Eric/Cr. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Award

De Luxe General, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
There was just cause for the three day suspensions
of George Mottola and Rudy Simolin. There was not
just cause for the three day suspension of Vincent
Licari. Licari's suspension is reversed and he
shall be paid for the time lost.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne 2/3 by the
Union and 1/3 by the Company.

Eric $'. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
)ss. :
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case #69A-13

In the Matter of the Arbitration
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Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

'
'
i

and

'
t

De Luxe General, Inc.
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The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the three day suspension
of George Mottola, Vincent Licari and Rudy Simolin?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the Company offices on September
9, 1969, at which time representatives of the Company and
Union appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer
evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath

and the contractual time limit for the rendition of the Award,
Post hearing briefs were filed„
The three grievants were suspended (together with seven
others whose suspensions are not contested by the Union) for
refusals to work overtime on Friday, February 21, 1969.
The Company contends that grievants Licari and Simolin
agreed to work that day, as evidenced by their names appearing on a list prepared by the working foreman* but that they
refused and failed to do so despite requests by the Company,
and warnings of disciplinary action.

The Company asserts

that grievant Mottola was directed to report for work that
day (as the Company needed one more employee in addition to
those nine whose names appeared on the foreman's list) but

- 2 that he failed and refused to do so despite the Company's repeated requests and warnings of disciplinary action.
The Union contends that the names of Licari and Simolin
were placed on the foreman's list without their authorization;
specifically, that Licari, when asked by the foreman if he
would be willing to work the overtime, responded that he
first would have to check with his wife, and therefore neither
A

gave nor was requested by the foreman for final answer; and
that Simolin was not asked at all.

The Union's position

with regard to Mottola is that his selection was mandatorily
imposed on him, contrary to the voluntary selection procedure agreed to by the Union and the Company for the compilation of the foreman's list.
These are disciplinary grievances, with the burden on
the Company to establish the grievants' wrongdoing.

I am

persuaded that the Company has met this burden with regard
to Mottola and Simolin but not in the case of Licari.
I agree with the Company's assertion that there is a
presumption in favor of the accuracy of the list prepared
by the working foreman.

The presumption is that the names

appearing thereon are of employees who voluntarily agreed
to work the day in question, as solicited by the foreman.
And having voluntarily agreed, the employees are so bound.
But obviously the presumption cannot be irrebuttable.
Licari testified that when asked if he would work the overtime, he responded that he would first have to check with
his wife to see if they had other plans.

He stated that

thereafter he did not tell the foreman that he would work,

- 3 nor was he asked for a final answer; and that accordingly his
name, indicating an agreement to work, was improperly placed
on the list.
sumption.

Standing alone this testimony rebuts the pre-

The Company offered no direct evidence contrary

to Licari's testimony.

The working foreman who prepared the

list did not testify (and I am not persuaded that merely because he is a member of the Union he would not have testified
truthfully if called) nor could any other Company witnesses
place Licari (who worked the night shift) at any of the
meetings between Company representatives and the affected
employees at which the latter were urged, at the risk of
disciplinary action, to perform the overtime work.

So I

find no direct evidence which would impute to Licari knowledge that his name was on the list and/or notice to him
that he had better work or be disciplined.

Therefore the

Company has not established to my satisfaction any wrongdoing
on the part of Licari.
The evidence is different with regard to Simolin.
worked the day shift.

He

Testimony by the Company placed him

at meetings, with the other affected day shift employees,
at which those employees were requested and directed to
work pursuant to the list compiled by the foreman, and were
warned of disciplinary action if they refused.

That testi-

mony together with the presumption in favor of the foreman's list stands unrebutted.

Simolin did not testify at

the hearing (he is now retired).

The Union offered only

secondary evidence, namely testimony that Simolin advised

- 4the Union that he was never asked by the foreman if he wished to work overtime.

Weighing the evidence on this point,

the testimony advanced by the Company is obviously more probative.

Accordingly, I conclude that Simolin placed his

name on the list,thereby agreeing to work, and thereafter
despite requests by the Company and a warning of disciplinary
action, refused to work the overtime.

Therefore his three

day suspension is upheld.
I find it immaterial whether or not Mottola's assignment was consistent with the Union-Company agreement on how
the men would be selected.

Confronted with a directive from

the Company to work the day in question, Mottola should have
obeyed that order, and grieved had he or the Union thought
the order improper.

This is such a well settled rule of

industrial relations that it need not be reiterated here.
And the conditions which permit certain exceptions to that
rule were not present in the instant situation.

So I must

reject the Union's contention that Mottola had a right to
refuse the assignment because his selection was not on a
voluntary basis, or in accordance with agreed upon seniority.
In doing so I make no decision one way or the other on the
question of whether the assignment of overtime work is voluntary or may be mandatorily ordered; but only that a directive to work should be carried out, reserving to the grievant and to the Union the right to grieve the propriety of
such a directive.

Accordingly, Mottola's three day suspen-

sion is upheld.

Eric y. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

'
PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORY INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

'
'

and

"

DuArt Laboratories

Award

'

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the Parties, Awards, as follows:
The grievances involved in these cases (69A-16
and 69A-17) are not arbitrable because they were
not filed for arbitration within the time limit
required by Section 15(b) of the contract.
The fee and expenses of the Arbitrator shall be
borne by the Union.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
' cC
) '

On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Cases 69A-16
69A-17

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
i

Local 702, Motion Picture Laboratory
Technicians, I.A.T.S.E.

'
'

and

'
1

DuArt Laboratories

'
'

Opinion
Cases
69A-16
69A-17

The threshold issue is procedural, - namely, whether
the grievances filed by the Union are barred from arbitration on the merits by Section 15(b) of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.
A hearing was held at the offices of the American
Arbitration Association on September 24, 1969 at which time
representatives of the above named parties appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to present their respective cases
on the arbitrability issue.

The Arbitrator's oath was ex-

pressly waived.
The Union's grievances were set forth in telegrams
dated May 21 and 22, 1969 to the Company which read in pertinent part respectively as follows:
We are in dispute with DuArt Laboratories ....
regarding C Printer in Color Printing Section.
We are in dispute with DuArt Film Laboratories ...
regarding the elimination of a foremanship in
Printing Room.
By letter dated June 25, 1969 to the Undersigned, Counsel
for the Union referred these grievances to arbitration.
Section 15(b) of the contract reads:
Should the employer and the Union be unable to
resolve the dispute within five working days
after written notice of said dispute has been
served, either party may refer the matter to
Eric J. Schmertz, Esq., as permanent arbitrator.

- 2 In any event, the request for arbitration to
the arbitrator must be made within thirty (30)
days after the giving or receipt of written
notice of such dispute, otherwise the right to
arbitrate is waived. The permanent arbitrator
shall render his decision within ten (10) days
of the final hearing of the dispute. (Underscoring supplied.)
Based on the foregoing contract language I have no
choice but to uphold the Company's contention that the grievances are not arbitrable.

There is no doubt that the "30

days" referred to in Section 15(b) means calendar days. For
elsewhere in the contract where the parties intended a time
limit to include only working days, or where Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays are excluded, the language so states
explicitly.
In the instant case the grievances were presented to
the Company on May 21 and 22 respectively, but were not referred to arbitration until June 25, or beyond the 30 calendar days required by Section 15 (b).
The language of Section 15(b), which the parties negotiated as part of their Collective Agreement, is not only
clear but mandatory.

It leaves no discretion in the hands

of the Arbitrator, and allows for no exceptions.

It states

that the requests for arbitration must be made within 30
days after notice of the dispute.

And it goes on to provide

that failure to do so in any event constitutes a waiver of
the right to arbitrate.

The phrase "in any event" ousts

the Arbitrator from considering the reasons or even extenuating circumstances which may have prevented the Union from
filing for arbitration within the time limit.

- 3 I remind the parties that the language of Section 15(b)
is what they themselves negotiated, and what they agreed to
as part of the contract bargain.

As the Arbitrator under

this contract I am bound to the terms and conditions negotiated by the parties.

It is my task to interpret and enforce

those terms and conditions, not to vary them.

In the face

of the explicit language of Section 15(b), for me to allow
these grievances to be arbitrated on the merits though they
were not filed for arbitration within the required 30 days,
would be to change the provisions of Section 15(b) of the
contract, no matter if I felt the Union's explanation to be
reasonable.
With the foregoing decision, Section 15(b) has been interpreted and applied as requested by the Company.

Therefore

there is no doubt as to the meaning and application of that
Section in this case and in connection with the processing of
future grievances to arbitration during my term as Permanent
Arbitrator.

In short, the integrity of Section 15(b) has been,

and will continue to be preserved.
With that done it seems to me that the Company might be
amenable to a recommendation, applicable solely to the two
grievances involved in this dispute.

It is, without any change

in my Award so far as the meaning of Section 15(b) is concerned, but in the interest of amicable labor relations, that these
grievances now be arbitrated on their merits, without creating
any procedural precedent whatsoever for the future.

As this

recommendation in no way alters my Award, it is for the Company, in its discretion, to decide whether it wishes to agree.

- 4If not, arbitration of the instant two grievances is barred.
If willing to accept the recommendation the Company would,
solely for these two grievances, waive the application of my
procedural Award.
In my view, since the Union's delay was not excessive,
but only 3 and 4 days beyond the limit, the cause of sound
labor relations might best be served if, in this instance,
the Company agreed to permit these matters to be arbitrated
on their merits; with the clear understanding that the Union
is hereafter bound without exception to the time limits of
Section 15(b).
I ask the Company to let me know what it wishes to do.

Eric J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'
'
r

Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO
and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

'
'
i
'
i
'
r

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties,and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
I find there is no presently effective agreement,
either under the contract or otherwise, covering
the performance of tape punching work. Accordingly I direct that the parties meet and attempt
to negotiate a written understanding covering
which employees are to be assigned to that work
and their rate of pay. The parties shall have
30 calendar days in which to negotiate that agreement. If an agreement is reached, its wage provisions shall be retroactive to the date of the
instant grievance. If an agreement is not reached within 30 calendar days the matter shall be referred back to me for a final and binding determination. Pending the negotiation of an agreement
or my determination, the tape punching work shall
continue to be performed by the expediters at the
expediter rate of pay0
The Arbitrator's fee and room rental expense for
the first hearing, which was adjourned at the Company's request, shall be borne by the Company.
The balance of the Arbitrator's fee and the room
rental expense for the second hearing shall be
shared equally by the Company and the Union.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: November /2"1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)
)* *

On this ' * day of November, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.
Case # 69A-14

~~

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

r

'
'
T

Motion Picture Laboratory Film Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E., AFL-CIO

'
'
r

and

'

Opinion
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DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

'

The stipulated issue is:
Under the circumstances presented, may a man
classified in one job occupation regularly perform duties of another job occupation? If not
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were scheduled or held at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on September 11 and October
20, 1969.

Representatives of the above named parties appear-

ed and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition
of the Award were expressly waived by the parties.
Specifically, the dispute involves the performance of
"tape punching" by employees classified as "expediters."
It is conceded that tape punching is not one of the
regular duties of the expediter classification.

The evidence

discloses, however, that that particular assignment has been
performed by the expediters at the expediter rate of pay,
since that classification was established in 1959.

The Com-

pany asserts that its assignment of tape punching to expediters was and has been in accordance with an oral agreement
reached in 1959 between the Company and the then Union leader-

- 2 ship; that the tape punching work has been performed primarily by expediters in accordance with that agreement consistently over the years; and that the Union is bound by it.
It is the Union's position that it knows of no such
agreement; that a search of its files fails to disclose any
notation or record of such an understanding with the Company.
It contends that, as at certain laboratories cited, tape
punching should be performed by employees of the timing department or by the Control Strip Cutters (Miscellaneous) at
the rate of $3.34 an hour.

(The expediter rate, at which the

employees are presently paid for tape punching, is $3.12 an
hour.)
I conclude that there is not now an effective agreement,
either under the contract or otherwise, covering the performance of the tape punching work.
Not only is it conceded that the work of tape punching
is not one of the normal or regular duties of the expediter
classification, but the contract does not place it within any
other classification or department.

Consequently, except in

situations involving a temporary transfer (which is not the
case here) the assignment of tape punching work on a regular
basis, to any job classification under the contract, including the expediters, changes the classification to which that
duty is attached.

But except for certain circumstances, also

not present here, Section 4(h) of the contract prohibits
changes in existing classifications "without the written consent of the Union."
The Company's reliance on an alleged 1959 agreement with

- 3 the Union for the assignment of tape punching to expediters
is evidence of the Company's recognition that it could not
unilaterally and regularly assign to any particular job classification, a duty not encompassed therein.

I am persuaded

that an oral understanding was reached in 1959 between the
Company and the then Union leadership which authorized the performance of tape punching work by expediters at the expediter
rate of pay0

I find that understanding to be valid and bind-

ing for the years that the employees worked under it, or until
the Union complained by its instant grievance0
though oral it was not void.

In other words,

But it is no longer enforceable.

Because Section 4(h) of the contract requires the written consent of the Union to changes in classification, that oral understanding may now be avoided by the Union.
This places the tape punching work in a "no man's land."
It is no longer properly assignable to the expediters because
the Union's grievance rescinds the prospectively unenforceable
1959 oral agreement0

And neither the contract nor any other

agreement permits its regular assignment elsewhere.

Therefore,

as the parties did in 1959, albeit imperfectly, and apparently
as the employers and the Union have done at other laboratories
throughout the industry, the parties must now negotiate an
effective understanding covering the handling of the tape
punching duties.
Accordingly I direct that the parties meet and attempt to
negotiate a written understanding covering which employees are
to be assigned to tape punching work and the rate to be paid
for that work.

The parties shall have 30 calendar days in

- 4which to negotiate that agreement.

If an agreement is reach-

ed its wage provisions shall be retroactive to the date of
the instant grievance.

If an agreement is not reached within

30 calendar days the matter shall be referred back to me for
final and binding determination.

Pending the negotiation of

an agreement or my determination, the tape punching work shall
continue to be performed by the expediters at the expediter
rate of pay.

Eric Jf Schmertz
i
Permanent Arbitrator

PERMANENT ARBITRATOR, MOTION PICTURE FILM LABORATORIES

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between

'

t
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.

'
'
r

and
DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

'
i

Award

'
\e Undersigned Arbitrator,

accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows:
Based on an agreed upon arrangement, the complement of the Gevachrome machine shall be three
men.
The Arbitrator's fee shall be borne by the
Company.

Eric f. Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

DATED: December
1969
STATE OF New York
)sg .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of December, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Motion Picture Laboratory Technicians
Local 702, I.A.T.S.E.
and

Opinion

DuArt Film Laboratories, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
What shall be the proper complement of the
Gevachrome machine?
A hearing was held at the Laboratory on November 4, 1969
at which time representatives of the above named parties
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross examine witnesses. The
parties expressly waived the Arbitrator's oath and the contract time limit for rendition of the Award.

The Union filed

a post hearing memorandum on November 20, 1969.
The Union contends that the Gevachrome machine should be
operated at all times with three men. The Company concedes
that three men are necessary when the "applicator" on the machine is used, but that when the machine is run without utilizing the applicator, only a crew of two is needed.
The Company asserts that the Gevachrome machine, when
operated without the applicator, is no different than the
Ektachrome machine (Pako) which runs with a crew of two, pursuant to the arbitration decision of July, 1966 of my predecessor, Mr. McMahon.
The Union argues that because the Gevachrome machine does
have an applicator it is different from the Ektachrome and the

- 2 McMahon Award therefore is not controlling.
As I have indicated in prior decisions, any conflict between the provisions of the contract or an agreement between
the parties and the actual complement needed to run a machine
must be resolved in favor of the former.

So, if the contract

requires, or if the parties reached a prior mutual agreement
on the use of three men on this type of machine, it is beyond my authority to fix the crew at two men even if that is
all that is necessary to run the operation.
The Gevachrome machine is a color developing or processing machine with an attached applicator.

It is undisputed by

the Company that other color developing machines with applicators in the Laboratory, namely developing machines #1, #2 and
#3, are run with a crew of three when one strand is developed
and with a crew of five for two strands.

The testimony of

Messrs. Vitello and Kaufman, of the Union and Company respectively, coincide on one crucial point, and that is that by
agreement between the parties, color developing machines with
applicators are and have been run with a crew of no less than
three men.
As I see it the question before me is whether this latter
referred to agreement applies to the Gevachrome machine, on
which the applicator is utilized only infrequently.
clude that it does.

I con-

The testimony discloses that at the time

color developing was introduced, the parties negotiated an
arrangement providing for a

minimum crew of three men on

color machines with applicators producing one strand of devel-

- 3 oped film.

Mr. Vitello stated and Mr. Kaufman conceded that

this arrangement applied to machines with applicators, irrespective of the amount of time that the applicator was in use,
Accordingly, though two men may be all that is necessare to run the Gevachrome machine when the applicator is not
in use, I must find that the arrangement expressly agreed to
by the parties, which was not conditioned upon when or the
quantity of time that the applicator is used, preempts any
actual need to the contrary.

Thus the instant case is dis-

tinguished from the facts before Mr. McMahon which led to
his Award of July 14, 1966.

Eric J^ Schmertz
Permanent Arbitrator

n

In the Matter of the Arbitration between

'
!

International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, Lodge #1717, AFL-CIO
and
Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.

'
'
i
'
i
'
i

Award

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by
the above-named Parties, and dated September 1, 1968 and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the Parties,
Awards, as follows:
The evidence falls short of establishing the
grievant's third violation of Shop Rule (n).
Accordingly, the discharge is reversed, and
the grievant, Ralph DiFronzo shall be reinstated. However, the reinstatement shall be without back pay, and the period of time between
the discharge and the reinstatement shall be
deemed a formal disciplinary suspension and so
noted in the grievant's employment record,,

Eric fl. Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: January /fo 1969

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers, Lodge #1717, AFL-CIO
and

Opinion

Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc.

In accordance with the Arbitration provisions of
Article XXIV of the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated
September 1, 1968 between Eaton, Yale & Towne, Inc., hereinafter referred to as the "Company," and International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, Lodge #1717,
AFL-CIO, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear and decide
the following stipulated issue:
Was there just cause for the discharge of Ralph
DiFronzo? If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on December 19, 1968 at which time Mr. DiFronzo, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant," and representatives of the Union
and Company, hereinafter referred to jointly as the "parties,"
appeared.

Full opportunity was afforded all concerned to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross examine
witnesses.
The grievant was discharged for an alleged third violation of Shop Rule (n), of Article XVI of the contract.
Rule reads:
The following breaches of regulations shall be
subject to a warning before disciplinary action
is taken:

Said

- 2 (n) visiting, loitering or loafing during
working hours.
The Union does not dispute, in this proceeding, the
Company's practice of discharging employees after three violations of any of the Shop Rules (m) through (u).

Nor does

the Union dispute the fact that the grievant was disciplined
twice before for breach of Rule (n); by written warning on
October 12, 1967, and by a two day suspension of February 2,
1968.

The Union only disputes the alleged third violation of

May 15, 1968 which triggered the grievant1s termination.
Therefore, the issue is joined over the events of May 15.
If the grievant is guilty of the third offense, his discharge
must be upheld, because the practice of terminating employees
after three offenses is not challenged by the Union.

On the

other hand, if that offense is not established, per force he
has not committed a third breach, and discharge would be unwarranted.
Because this is a discharge case, the burden is on the
Company to establish the grievant1s culpability to the satisfaction of the Arbitrator by clear and convincing evidence.
Neither the Union nor the grievant must assume the initiative
to prove the former's innocence.
By the evidence presented, the Company has established
to my satisfaction that on May 15, the grievant was away from
his work area several times during his shift, for more than
normal periods of time.

But the evidence falls short of

proving that his absences were improper, or constituted loafing or loitering within the meaning of Shop Rule (n).

The

- 3Company has shown that the grievant was away from his work
place, but it has not shown where he was and what he was doing.

The Company concedes that if the grievant had been in

the men's room or at one of the two tool cribs seeking a
tool, or seeking a blueprint at the area where blueprints
are filed, his absence from his work area would have been
neither improper nor violative of Rule (n).

The Company is

unable to show that the grievant was not in one of these
places.
Rather, the Company concludes, based on the grievant's
two prior breaches of the Rule and the length of time he was
absent from his work area, that on May 15 he left his work
place to loiter or to loaf, or for some other purpose unrelated to his work assignment.

This may well be so, but there

is no hard evidence to support the conclusion.

Frankly, I

too am suspicious about the grievant's whereabouts.

That he

could have been in the men's room or obtaining a tool or a
blueprint, are possibe.

But the number of times he was away;

the length of his absences and the fact that when he returned to his work area he was carrying neither a tool, nor a
blueprint, cast some doubt on these possibilities.

Yet the

evidence falls short of dispelling those possibilities, and
I hold that the Company should do so to support the ultimate
penalty of discharge.

So though 1 am not prepared to find

that the absences from his work area were proper or related
to his work assignments, I am unable to conclude, based on
the record before me, that he was away from his work area
"visiting, loitering or loafing during working hours" as

- 4proscribed by Shop Rule (n).
However, by no means do I hold the grievant blameless.
I am not satisfied that he met his basic obligations as an
employee and Shop Steward,,
not a guessing game.

The employment relationship is

The Company pays the grievant for a

full and fair day's work.

When, as here, the Company had

good reason to question his whereabouts, and confronted him
with an accusation of "loafing, etc." he should have accounted fully and precisely for his time.

But when supervision

first questioned him about his whereabouts, his answer was
vague at best.

And later, when he was told of his discipline

for the Rule violation, he neither responded nor offered any
explanation.

To withhold a response; to equivocate; or to

adopt a cavalier attitude regarding lengthy absences from
his work area; so as to leave the Company no choice but to
discipline him in order to test the propriety of his absences,
is inconsistent with the special duty of a Steward to seek
adjustment of disputes amicably, and incongruous with his
status as an employee who is paid for work performed.

And it

adds further fuel to the fires of suspicion concerning his
actual whereabouts.
Accordingly, though the evidence falls short of establishing a breach of Shop Rule (n), 1 am not prepared to reinstate him without some penalty.

Accordingly, under my

authority to fashion a remedy, I direct that the grievant's
discharge be reduced to a suspension.
without back pay.

He shall be reinstated

The period of time from the date of his

discharge to the date of his reinstatement shall be deemed a

- 5formal suspension and so noted in his employment record.
The grievant is warned that a continuation of excessive
or unexplained absences from his work area would create, in
the opinion of this Arbitrator, a strong if not irrebuttable
presumption of a third violation of Shop Rule (n) warranting summary discharge; which because of the grievant's prior
record, including the suspension imposed in this case, should
be upheld by any subsequent arbitrator.

Eric JT. Schmertz
Arbitrator

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, NEW YORK CITY TAXICAB INDUSTRY

In the Matter of the Arbitration between
Trustees, Taxicab Industry Health &
Welfare Fund and Trustees Taxicab
Industry Pension Fund
and

AWARD

Fathom Service Corp.

This proceeding was instituted by the Trustees of the
Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund and the Trustees of
the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund, hereinafter referred to as
the "Trustees", for a determination of the amounts that
Fathom Service Corp, hereinafter referred to as "Fathom" owes
said Funds,and for an order directing payment thereof.
On due notice a hearing was held at the offices of the
American Arbitration Association on May 20, 1969 at which
time representatives of the Trustees and Fathom appeared and
were afforded full opportunity to present their respective
cases.
Having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the
Trustees and Fathom, the Undersigned, as Impartial Chairman
under the Industry Contract, renders the following AWARD:
As of December 31, 1968 Fathom owed and still owes
the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare Fund the sum
of $21,198.
For the period January 1 through April 30, 1969
Fathom owes the Taxicab Industry Health & Welfare
Fund the sum of $13,076.63
For the period January 1 through April 30, 1969
Fathom owes the Taxicab Industry Pension Fund the

- 2 sum of $4166.18.
The aforementioned sums owed by Fathom to said
funds are past due and conceded by Fathom.
Accordingly Fathom is directed to pay the amounts
due to said Funds forthwith.

Eric a. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED: May 2& 1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

)ss .
) ""

On this 2>O day of May, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the
same0

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF MEDIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union District 50
United Mine Workers of America
and

Award

P. Feiner & Sons, Inc.

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Arbitration Agreement entered into by the
above-named Parties and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the Parties, Awards as follows;
1. Juan Resto is entitled to and shall be paid
holiday pay for July 4, 1969.
2. Hans Toborg, Joseph Richards and Henry Rosenbaum
were not discriminatorily denied merit increases.
3. The discharges of Hans Toborg and Joseph Richards
were not for just cause. They shall be reinstated
with back pay and full benefits.

Eric /6.Schmertz
Arbitrator

DATED: October
1969
STATE OF New York
COUNTY OF New York

^r

ss. :

On this
day of October, 1969, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to
me to be the individual described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.
Case # A69-1070

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union District 50
United Mine Workers of America
and

'

P. Feiner & Sons, Inc.

Opinion

i

The stipulated issues in dispute are;
1. Is Juan Resto entitled to holiday pay for
July 4, 1969?
2. Were employees Hans Toborg, Joseph Richards
and Henry Rosenbaum discriminated against in
the giving of merit increases?
3. Were the discharges of Hans Toborg and Joseph
Richards for just cause? If not what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the New York State
Board of Mediation on October 6, 1969 at which time representatives of the above named parties appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross examine witnesses.
waived the Arbitrator's oath.

The parties expressly

Post hearing data was filed

and the hearing was declared closed on October 10, 1969.
During the week in which July 4, 1969 fell, Juan Resto
was on his honeymoon.

Prior to leaving Resto notified the

Company of the reason for and duration of his absence from
work.

The Company raised no objection; nor does the Company

contend that his absence was improper.

I find that Resto

did what would customarily be expected of him in order to
obtain the Company's approval for his absence and that the
Company in no way indicated that the time off for the
stated purpose was not approved.

I conclude that under

- 2 those circumstances Mr. Resto's absence the day before and
the day after the July 4, 1969 holiday was for an "acceptable
reason" within the meaning of Article VI Section 2(a) of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Accordingly he is entitled

to holiday pay for July 4, 1969.
In June 1969 the Company granted merit increases to all
employees except Hans Toborg, Joseph Richards and Henry Rosenbaum.

The Union contends that the failure to grant merit

increases to those three employees was discriminatory.

The

Company claims they were not granted increases because they
did not merit them.

It asserts that Rosenbaum's work is un-

satisfactory; that Messrs. Toborg and Richards have a record
of excessive absenteeism; and that Toborg is "accident prone."
The main thrust of the Union's case centers on Toborg who is
the Union steward.

The Union claims he was denied a merit

increase because of his aggressive activity on behalf of the
Union; that his absentee record includes hours on legitimate
Union business; and to penalize him for that activity, by a
denial of a merit increase, constitutes discrimination against
him for his proper work as a Union representative.

Further

the Union disputes the propriety of any penalty to or adverse
reflection on Toborg for his two lost time accidents which
occurred, respectively in August 1965 and February 19660
The attendance record of Richards contains significantly
more absences than any other employee except Toborg.

Also

the Union does not refute the Company's claim that Rosenbaum's
work has not been satisfactory.

As work performance and

attendance are proper matters for consideration in determining

- 3 an employee's merit, especially in the exercise of management's
discretion in granting merit increases, I find that the Company's decision to withhold those increases from Rosenbaum
and Richards was not discriminatory.

Therefore the grievance

on behalf of Messrs. Richards and Rosenbaum for merit increases
is denied.
There is no showing by the Company that Toborg's accidents
were willfully incurred or due to his negligence.

Hence I

find no basis upon which they should be held or used against
him in determining his merit as an employee, even if, as a
result, the Company's compensation rate was increased.
Toborg's absenteeism includes time spent on Union business.

But the latter amount of time is only a relatively

small portion of the total.

The net amount of time that he

has been absent or away from his work duties (excluding the
hours spent on legitimate Union business) is significantly in
excess of any other employee who received a merit increase.
Therefore I cannot conclude that he was denied a merit increase because of absences (or a substantial part thereof)
due to Union business.

Rather, though the Employer candidly

admits that Toborg has been a "thorn in his side" as a Union
representative, I must conclude, as the Company asserts that
the denial of the merit increase was properly based on the
quantity of absences, other than for Union business.

And,as

it is well settled that an employee's attendance record may
be considered in deciding his eligibility for a merit increase,
the Company's determination that Toborg was ineligible because of the magnitude of his record of absenteeism, was not

- 4 discriminator}/.

Therefore Toborg's grievance for a merit in-

crease is denied.
Hans Toborg and Joseph Richards were discharged because
of "violations of Company rules and absenteeism."

Though the

Company claims that Toborg has violated many Company rules,
the only one specified in this proceeding occurred on September 12, 1969 when Toborg used the wrong plant door to leave
the factory.

The charge of a rule violation against Richards

is that he "accompanied Toborg."

In addition, both men are

charged with absenteeism.
It is well settled that violations of Company rules and
absenteeism constitute grounds for disciplinary action including discharge.

But both offenses - absenteeism and the type

of rule violations involved herein - do not warrant summary
dismissal.

Instead they represent circumstances to which the

well recognized rule of "progressive discipline" should apply.
In other words, formal warning and/or suspension should first
be imposed in order to place the employees on notice that
their conduct is improper and to afford them an opportunity to
rectify it.

Thereafter, if there is no improvement in their

record or conduct, discharge would be warranted.

So far as

the record before me is concerned, neither Toborg nor Richards
were previously warned or disciplined, on a formal basis,
either for violations of Company rules or for absenteeism.
Accordingly, even if they are guilty of offenses charged,
their discharges were premature and precipitous.
I find it unnecessary

On that basis

to decide whether the Company rules, uni-

laterly promulgated by the Company, are vitiated b

the pro-

- 5 visions of Article VII Section 5 of the contract.

Toborg

and Richards shall be reinstated with back pay and full ben
efits.

Eric
Arbitrator

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 471, International Union of
Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers
AFL-CIO
and

Award

Ford Instrument Division
Sperry Rand Corporation

The Undersigned Arbitrator, having been designated in
accordance with the Collective Bargaining Agreement dated
June 3, 1967, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties, makes the following Award;
When the grievant, Joseph Vesey was laid off on
February 7, 1969, the work then being performed
by Leonard Green was essentially that of mechanical engineering and within the scope of the Senior
Engineer classification.

I find that Vesey possess-

ed the technical, scientific and educational qualifications to perform that work.

I need not decide

whether a "tight schedule" imposed by the Air Force,
or time to obtain inoculations for overseas work
are relevant to determining "qualifications to do
the work available," under Section 3(D) (1) of the
contract because I do not believe that either represented an impediment to Green's replacement by
Vesey.

With engineer Jaffee as "lead engineer"

(who performed the same type of work alone for a
significant portion of the regular 35 day time lim-

- 2it at an earlier installation) I am not persuaded that Jaffee and Vesey (as a replacement
for Green) could not have performed and completed the available work within the shorter time
limit as fixed by the Air Force.

Within the

two week period between notice of his layoff and
the date of his actual layoff, Vesey could have
substantially

completed his inoculations, and

even if the time to obtain inoculations is relevant,
I do not consider it unreasonable to require the
Company to retain Green an additional week, if
necessary, in order to afford Vesey, who was otherwise qualified, a third week for the inoculations
"to take."
Accordingly, the Company erred when it retained
the junior employee, Green and laid off Vesey
who possessed greater seniority.

Mr. Vesey shall

be reinstated and made whole for the time lost.

Eric/3. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: March
1969
STATE OF New York
)gs .
COUNTY OF New York
)
On this
day of March, 1969, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same,

